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ESSAY
STIMULUS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Olatunde C.A. Johnson*
Federal spending has the capacity to perpetuate racial inequality, not
simply through explicit exclusion, but through choices made in the legislative
and institutionaldesign of spending programs. Drawing on the lessons of
New Deal and postwar socialprograms, this Essay offers an account of the
specificfeatures offederal spending that give it salience in structuringracial
arrangements. Federalspendingprograms, this Essay argues, are relevant in
structuringracial inequality due to their massive scale, their creation of new
programmatic and spending infrastructures, and the choices made in these
programs as to whether to impose explicit inclusionary norms on states and
localities. Exploring these features has relevancefor understandingthe current stimulus. Key aspects of the stimulus entrenchfunding and programmatic structures that promote racialinequality, defer to states and localities
rather than advance explicit civil rights rules and norms, and miss key opportunities to innovate to promote racial inclusion and equity.
Yet, this Essay argues that even with these limitations, the stimulus
presents opportunitiesfor civil society groups to learnfrom the lessons of New
Deal and postwar programs by using the stimulus to promote racial inclusion and equality. Indeed, this Essay shows that the magnitude of the stimulus is generating a new set of laws and regulatory institutions designed to
promote transparency and accountability in federal spending. These interventions, this Essay suggests, provide promise for interruptingthe mechanisms through which federal spendingperpetuates inequality, and for leveraging the stimulus to advance racial inclusion.
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INTRODUCTION

The 2009 federal stimulus package, formally known as the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, or the Recovery Act), 1
2
has sparked debates akin to those that occurred during the New Deal.
Most pronounced have been discussions about federal spending's capac1. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
2. During this period, public leaders and policymakers disagreed on the economic
benefits of increased federal spending. See James T. Patterson, Congressional
Conservatism and The New Deal 133, 234 (1967) (describing New Deal advocacy in favor
of increased federal spending to stimulate economic recovery); id. at 140-41, 189, 298
(describing congressional and public resistance to relief spending and to federal
intervention in private markets). New Deal social welfare programs also provoked debates
on the proper role of the federal government in providing and administering social
insurance. See Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American
Welfare State 28 (1998) [hereinafter Lieberman, Color Line] (describing southern
skepticism of federal intervention through provision of social security); Ann Shola Orloff,
The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare State, in The Politics of Social Policy in
the United States 37, 70-71 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988) (describing political
resistance to federal centralization of social insurance programs).
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ity to reignite an economy in recession, 3 but commentators have invoked
other parallels. Much as during the time of the New Deal, some commentators and state officials have argued that the massive stimulus spending effort-the biggest infusion of federal funds to states since the New
Deal-rewrites federal-state relations. 4 States' rights arguments may have
proved short-lived: Only a few states appear to be refusing federal stimulus money, and state legislative sovereignty measures to resist the stimulus
have largely faltered. 5 Yet, the sheer amount of new federal money provided to states under the stimulus, and the conditions attached to some of
these federal funds, raise questions about the federal government's expanding power to shape, through spending, a broad set of institutional
6
arrangements at the state and local levels.
3. Compare Cong. Budget Office, Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from October 2009 Through
December 2009, at 1-2 (2010), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/1lOxx/doc11044/02-23ARRA.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding stimulus added between 1
million and 2.1 million jobs in fourth quarter of 2009 and GDP was between 1.5% and
3.5% higher than it would have been in absence of stimulus package), and Council of
Econ. Advisors, Exec. Office of the President, The Economic Impact of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Second Quarterly Report 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/100113-economic-impact-arrasecond-quarterly-report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (claiming stimulus
package was responsible for boosting Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and lowering
unemployment), with Karen Campbell, Ctr. for Data Analysis, Heritage Found., Did the
Stimulus Create Jobs? White House Economic Report Is Unclear 1-3 (2010), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Researcb/Reports/2010/02/Did-the-Stimulus-Create-obsWhite-House-Economic-Report-Is-Unclear (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing
White House's benchmarks for GDP and unemployment were arbitrary and claiming
economic benefits were illusory).
4. See, e.g., William Yardley, Bids to Push States' Rights Falter in Face of Stimulus,
N.Y. Times, May 8, 2009, at A14 ("Frustrated by federal policies like the bank bailout...
they drafted so-called sovereignty resolutions, aggressive interpretations of states' rights
outlined in the Tenth Amendment.").
5. See id. ("With the recession sparing few corners of the country, the $787 billion
federal stimulus package has weakened the resolve of states' rights activists in legislatures
across the country."). The Republican Governor of Louisiana opposed the concept of a
federal stimulus plan, and has particularly resisted stimulus funds to extend federal-state
programs providing health care for the poor, including the uninsured and families moving
from welfare to work, as well as expansions in unemployment insurance. See WDSU New
Orleans, Jindal Says 'No' to Health Care Stimulus Funds (Mar. 31, 2009, 10:47 PM), at
http://www.wdsu.com/money/19057646/detail.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (explaining Jindal's opposition to stimulus funds for extended Medicaid for
welfare recipients who begin working and for increased amounts of money for hospitals
treating a "disproportionate share" of poor and underinsured). The Governor's refusal to
accept "disproportionate share" funding may not impact state residents as the state does
not currently use its entire federal allocation under the program, and no cuts are expected
in the program. Id.
6. See, e.g., Greg Hitt & Jonathan Weisman, Congress Strikes $789 Billion Stimulus
Deal, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 2009, at Al (describing "economic-recovery package" as "one of
the largest economic rescue programs since Franklin Roosevelt launched the New Deal");
Steven Mufson, For Insight on Stimulus Battle, Look to the '30s, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 2009,
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To date, however, commentators have focused little attention on a
related parallel between the current stimulus effort and the New Deal:
the power of each to produce and reproduce racial inequality. Indeed,
while a handful of legal scholars have written compellingly about the racial impacts of New Deal programs, 7 the civil rights impacts of federal
spending programs have not been a core focus of legal commentary.
This omission may stem from legal commentary's relative inattention
to the federal government as a source of racial harm. The canonical idea
of the federal role in civil rights is not of federal government discrimination, but of federal power invoked against recalcitrant states, localities,
and private parties. 8 When legal commentators turn to the connections
between federal spending and civil rights, it is generally to examine
Congress's use of the Constitution's spending power to remedy racial discrimination, and the attendant doctrinal question of the limits of this
power. 9
Moreover, the question of how law relates to matters of federal
spending and racial inequality is less than clear. Complex, messy, and at
times contested, the role that federal social welfare and housing programs have played in embedding racial discrimination might seem better
suited to historical examination than civil rights law's traditional understanding of fault and complicity. The federal government involves multiple actors and shared responsibility with states and localities. Its multifarious actions are not easily amenable to a legal framework that depends
largely on notions of causation and intent.10 Looking for federal discrimat DOI (quoting then-Chairman of Council of Economic Advisors Christina Romer's
statement that "current stimulus is much bigger than anything Roosevelt tried").
7. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165,
203-17 (2001) [hereinafter Forbath, New Deal] (discussing changes to New Deal
legislation forced by southern Democrats and how these changes impacted African
Americans); Deborah C. Malamud, "Who They Are-or Were": Middle-Class Welfare in
the Early New Deal, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2019, 2058-59 (2003) ("It is also undeniable that
blacks did in fact face considerable discrimination when they applied for benefits.").
Historians and political scientists have produced a wealth of scholarship on the question of
the racializing effects of the New Deal and other federal programs. E.g., Ira Katznelson,
When Affirmative Action Was White (2005).
8. Cf. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (2006) (prohibiting
states from engaging in discriminatory voting practices); Titie VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (prohibiting discrimination by private employers); Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (prohibiting discrimination in sale, rental, or
financing of residential real estate); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (prohibiting disability discrimination by both public and private entities).
9. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts
Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345 (2008) (predicting indirect attempts by Roberts Court to limit
Congress's spending power); Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through
the Spending Power, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1575 (2002) (arguing Congress can constitutionally
enact affirmative action programs to remedy societal discrimination pursuant to its
spending power).
10. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that
proving intentional discrimination under equal protection requires that "the
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ination through an equal protection lens may lead legal scholars to overemphasize explicit and official forms of discrimination, while overlooking
the assortment of federal actions and inactions at the level of policy design and implementation that create more complex forms of inequality.1 1
This Essay argues that the stimulus, much like the New Deal, makes
plain federal spending's power to exacerbate racial inequality. Legal
scholars have recognized that setting conditions on federal spending can
serve as a powerful tool for requiring states, localities, and private parties
to comply with national antidiscrimination rules. 12 But conditional
spending is just one mechanism through which federal spending shapes
equity outcomes. New Deal and postwar social programs expanded protections and opportunities for African Americans and other groups, but
they also inscribed racial divisions that contributed to the stark racial inequities in wealth, labor market participation, and housing that continue
today. 13 This Essay argues that specific mechanisms in the legislative and
institutional design of twentieth-century social programs-more than explicit categories of racial exclusion-allowed these federal spending programs to restructure state, local, and private institutions and to create
new funding streams that led to racial inequality. This Essay contends
that, in much the same way, significant aspects of the legislative design of
the stimulus threaten to preserve and even deepen racial inequality.
At the same time, this Essay argues, the stimulus provides a powerful
occasion for using federal funds to promote racial equity. Federal law
now provides tools unavailable to racial reformers of the New Deal era for
guiding how federal money is spent. Indeed, as a result of the legislative
gains of the 1960s, federal spending has become a potent vehicle for advancing antidiscrimination norms. By conditioning spending, federal
statutes prohibit intentional racial exclusion by federally funded grantees,
and even impose affirmative duties on federal agencies and grantees to
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group"); Ralph
Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law,
Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1095 (2009) (noting "near impossibility
of invalidating legislative acts that are formally race neutral"),
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Boling Alone, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 975, 979, 1023-24
(2004) (contending that few equal protection cases arise against federal government
because Congress and Executive hold same antidiscrimination norms as federal courts).
12. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 350 (noting "liberal welfare and civil-rights
state [is] built on conditional spending legislation").
13. Neighborhoods of intense racial segregation and poverty concentration tend to
have lower quality schools. They also tend to be isolated from valuable employment
opportunities as well as other resources that facilitate mobility. See Michael K. Brown et
al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society 74-77 (2003) [hereinafter
Brown, Whitewashing Race] (arguing black exclusion from postwar federal program for
veterans significantly contributed to contemporary wealth and labor market inequality);
Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making
of the Underclass 148-85 (1993) (discussing role of housing barriers in "the perpetuation
of the underclass").
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attend to, and to interrupt, the varied and complex ways in which federal
funds sustain racial inequality. 14 These statutes are useful not only in litigation but also in allowing civil rights and equity groups to mobilize
around the broad idea that government spending should not entrench or
subsidize racial inequality.
Beyond antidiscrimination law, however, the stimulus reveals new
mechanisms for advancing equity. Federal statutes require transparency
in federal spending programs. New regulatory institutions at the federal,
state, and local levels track stimulus spending. Recent technology allows
governments and nongovernmental organizations to document and disseminate spending information to the broader public. These tools
render the oft hidden racial impacts of federal spending visible and allow
equity groups to map racial harms in compelling ways. Thus, the stimulus
has potential, this Essay suggests, for engendering a new regulatory and
advocacy framework for advancing racial equity through federal
spending.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I argues that the history of
twentieth-century housing and social welfare programs reveals that these
programs achieved their harm not simply through explicit racial exclusion, but through a set of decisions about institutional design and structure that expanded and cemented racial inequality. This Part discusses
three frames for understanding the complex ways in which federal spending structures racial arrangements. Part II argues that the stimulus risks
repeating history. This Part shows how important design aspects of the
stimulus's housing and transportation programs risk cementing and even
expanding racial inequality by buttressing unequal twentieth-century
funding and programmatic structures and by failing to impose affirmative
civil rights and inclusion norms.
Part III argues that, through attention to implementation, the stimulus can serve as an important point for both governmental and nongovernmental organizations to use federal spending to promote racial equality. The Essay suggests that this will not happen primarily through courtenforced civil rights law, but instead as civil rights and equity groups build
on new rules and regulatory entities created to promote transparency and
accountability in implementation of stimulus programs.
I.

SPENDING'S POWER:

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Civil rights commentary has not centrally focused on the connection
between race and federal spending; yet it is increasingly clear from recent
social science literature that federal grant programs in housing, transportation, and social welfare generated significant racial harms.1 5 Indeed,
an explicit goal of recent historical accounts is to explain contemporary
14. See infra Part III.A-B.
15. See, e.g., Katznelson, supra note 7, at 142-43 (noting immense "damage to racial
equity" caused by black exclusion from Social Security, veterans' benefits, and other social
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and existing patterns of racial inequality by recovering a history of discrimination in federal programs often omitted from standard civil rights
narratives. 16 By these accounts, the federal government's social security,
housing, and transportation programs contributed greatly to contemporary and persistent disparities in wealth, and to current patterns of segre17
gation and concentration of poverty.
The aim in this Part is not to buttress the well-documented case that
federal grant programs are a central source of racial harm. 18 Rather, it is
to understand the federal-level decisions and design choices that helped
produce these harms. These harms, this Essay contends, are not simply
the result of official or explicitly discriminatory acts, nor are they invidious or intentional in the way the law typically understands discrimination.' 9 Rather, they involve a range of federal-level decisions and inactions in program design and implementation that operate to exacerbate
racial inequality. In what follows, this Essay provides a framework for understanding these mechanisms. Its contention is that federal spending
programs are salient in producing racial inequality due to their massive
scale, their creation of new programmatic and spending infrastructures,
and through their failure to impose explicit inclusionary norms. As explicit racial exclusion is likely to be less dominant today than in the New
Deal or postwar era, it is only by attending to how these mechanisms operated in the past that we can begin to understand the stimulus's power
to structure racial outcomes today.
A. Scale
The most obvious reason to explore federal spending's impact on
questions of civil rights and equality is no doubt its scale. The Recovery
Act, for instance, provides more than $787 billion of federal funds, including new funding for a range of infrastructure and social welfare programs. 20 Federal spending transfers resources to individuals, communiwelfare programs); Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 149-53 (documenting
socioeconomic harm of residential segregation).
16. See Brown, Whitewashing Race, supra note 13, at 68-103 (showing effect of
federal government's social welfare programs on persistent racial inequality). See
generally Katznelson, supra note 7 (detailing history of African American exclusion from
twentieth-century social security, military, and labor programs). Another motivation is to
shift the theoretical basis for contemporary remedial and civil rights programs, like
affirmative action. Arguing that inequality is both state-generated and the product of
recent exclusions strengthens the empirical and moral bases for remedial action. See id. at
162 (proposing renewed program of affirmative action to both transcend race and rectify
racial injustice).
17. See supra note 15 (citing sources discussing these effects).
18. See generally Katznelson, supra note 7 (detailing racially discriminatory effects of
federal spending programs in the 1930s and 1940s).
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting legal framework often requires
showing of causation and intent).
20. See infra Part II.A (detailing specific programs funded by Act and amounts
reserved for those programs).
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ties, states, and localities, with evident distributional consequences. One
consequence is increased national power to influence state and local policies and programs. 21 Increased federal spending in the postwar period in
areas such as health, education, and income security provided new
sources of financing for programs that serve vulnerable populations, and
new federal power and responsibility in areas traditionally the domain of
22
states and localities.
Scale also ensures far-ranging equity consequences from national
level decisions on who to include and exclude. The most notorious example stems from the New Deal. The exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from the Social Security Act of 1935 meant that sixty-five
percent of black workers would be excluded from the pension program. 23 These occupational exclusions would remain in place until 1954,
depriving African Americans of an important source of income and
24
wealth formation.
Massive outlays of federal funds reshape policy and programs at the
local level. The substantial new federal investment in housing and transportation in the postwar period funded highway programs, public housing construction, and suburban housing expansion, all of which helped
produce the concentrated poverty and spatial segregation that persist today.25 The programs that helped to cement racial housing segregation in
the postwar era were made possible by federal funds, jointly administered
and financed at the state and local levels. State and local governments
used new federal funding streams from federal lending programs, urban
renewal, and public housing to expand residential segregation.2 6 In the
North, this funding infrastructure served to deepen racialized housing

21. Federal grants have risen from less than one percent of states' GDP in the 1940s to
about three percent of GDP since the 1970s. Daniel Klaff & Adam Lawton, Conditional
Spending and Other Forms of Cost Sharing 32 fig.3 (Harvard Law Sch. Fed. Budget Policy
Seminar, Briefing Paper No. 18, 2008), available at www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
hjackson/ConditionalSpending_18(rev).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Even
more telling is the steep postwar rise in federal support in a few areas: education, income
security, and health. See id. at 32 fig.2.
22. See Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism 13-14 (1995) (asserting that
through spending programs the federal government maintains some power over states
even in areas of state control).
23. See Katznelson, supra note 7, at 43 ("Across the nation, fully 65 percent of African
Americans fell outside the reach of the new programs; between 70 and 80 percent in
different parts of the South.").
24. See Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New
Perspective on Racial Inequality 40-41 (2006) (documenting how inequities in Social
Security contributed to contemporary racial disparities in wealth).
25. See Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 149-53 ("[T]he persistence of racial
barriers [to integration] implies the systematic exclusion of blacks from benefits and
resources that are distributed through housing markets.").
26. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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patterns and, strikingly, throughout the South, created residential segrega27
tion for the first time.
B. Embedding Racial Inequality
Federal spending programs create new programmatic and funding
structures that help sustain existing patterns of racial inequality. The segregative effect of twentieth-century housing programs provides an important example. In the public housing context, federal spending cemented
patterns of discrimination and segregation in housing that existed before
the federal funding stream. In the North, the executive branch's refusal
to create housing opportunities for blacks in low-poverty suburbs reflected a norm that poor African Americans would be spatially segregated
from whites of all classes. 28 Rampant private discrimination by whites,
particularly in the North in the early part of the century, in the wake of
the Great Migration, shaped the residential housing patterns upon which
the federal government built.2 9 In the North, this infrastructure served
to expand and deepen racial housing patterns.3 0 As the federal government became involved through urban renewal and the construction of
low-income housing, resistance by state and local governments and white
communities to the presence of blacks in white neighborhoods influenced decisions on where public housing was located.3 '
27. See Massey & Denton, supra note 12, at 42-53 (detailing role of federal programs
in creating urban ghettos in South for first time). Residential patterns of segregation had
been less pronounced in the South than in the North. See id. at 25-26, 41-42, 48-49
(comparing segregation levels and growth in southern cities with those in North). The
federal government persuaded some states to enact legislation to provide states and
localities with the legal authority to develop public housing. See Nathaniel Keith, Politics
and the Housing Crisis Since 1930, at 28-29 (1973) ("When the PWA Housing Division
wound up its activities in late 1937, 29 states had passed enabling legislation and 46 local
housing authorities had actually been established.").
28. See Arnold Hirsch, The Last and Most Difficult Barrier: Segregation and Federal
Housing Policy in the Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960, at 13-15 (2005)
[hereinafter Hirsch, Difficult Barrier], available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/hirsch.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Eisenhower Administration's failures to
address racial effects of housing policy).
29. See Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 36-37 (detailing various forms of
resistance to integrated housing).
30. See id. at 45-49 (discussing statistics showing increased residential segregation
between 1930 and 1970).
31. See Hirsch, Difficult Barrier, supra note 28, at 38-39 (discussing failure of federal
government to require local officials to adopt "workable plan" that would have allowed
non-whites to be relocated in "outlying vacant land"); see also id. at 48 (describing
adherence by housing agencies to pre-Brown policies and refusals which left "[t]he color
line at the housing agencies . . . intact"); id. at 59 (detailing dynamic in which urban
renewal displaced inner-city residents and sent them to public housing, resulting in
radically changed racial demographics of public housing between 1948 and 1959); Massey
& Denton, supra note 13, at 55-57 (detailing mobilization by white communities, city
councils, and mayors to block construction of public housing in white neighborhoods and
concluding that resulting segregation "in economic as well as social terms-was the direct
result of an unprecedented collaboration between local and national government").
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The essential concept-that poor blacks lived in inner cities and that
whites lived in suburbs-would provide the frame for mid-century policies in public housing and urban renewal. It is not simply that they would
go unchallenged by federal policy, but that they would become the operative frame that guided federal policy. In the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education,3 2 local authorities in the South exploited this new federal
funding structure in housing to create segregatory living patterns that
had not before existed. 33 Federal urban renewal and public housing poli4
cies thus institutionalized segregation, lending it new permanence.3
A similar account can be found in the housing loan programs subsidized by the federal government. 35 Federal agencies, following patterns
established by the private sector, institutionalized redlining, consistently
undervaluing black and integrated neighborhoods for the purpose of
making mortgage loans. 36 The redlining practices influenced federal
loan decisions and those of private banks, and contributed to the deterioration of predominantly black urban neighborhoods. 37 Federal loans
provided to veterans were particularly powerful forces behind the tre32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 52-53 (arguing government policies were
responsible for a much larger and more significant disinvestment in black areas by private
institutions"). Residential patterns of segregation had been less pronounced in the South
than in the North. See id. at 25-26, 41-42, 48-49 (examining statistical evidence of
changes in housing segregation). The federal government actually persuaded some states
to enact legislation to provide states and localities with the legal authority to develop public
housing. See Keith, supra note 27, at 28-29 (noting "President Roosevelt wrote the
Governors urging the enactment of . . . state legislation" to establish local housing
authorities).
34. See Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 54-55 ("[B]y the late 1950s, many cities
were locked into a spiral of decline that was directly encouraged ... by federal housing
policies.").
35. See Keith, supra note 27, at 21-22 (pointing to early federal failures to address
housing crisis).
36. "Redlining" describes the government and industry practice that began in the
1920s and 1930s of assigning risks to neighborhoods for the purpose of providing home
mortgages. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) formalized a rating system
that assigned risks to neighborhoods based on assessments of their quality; neighborhoods
with the lowest quality were coded red. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The
Suburbanization of the United States 196-97 (1985) [hereinafter Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier] (providing evidence that HOLC "initiated the practices of 'red lining'"); Massey
& Denton, supra note 13, at 51-52 (discussing development of "redlining" practices). As a
matter of practice, HOLC assigned the lowest rating to majority black neighborhoods,
explicitly rating as a negative factor the density of blacks, without regard to other factors.
See id. at 199-201 (detailing role of race as factor in HOLC appraisals in St. Louis
metropolitan area). The effect of this was to redirect valuable loans away from black
neighborhoods, or neighborhoods that looked like they might become predominantly
black. Id. at 52.
37. See Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 52 ("[P]rivate banks relied heavily on the
HOLC system to make their own loan decisions, and the agency's 'Residential Security
Maps' were widely circulated throughout the lending industry ....
Thus HOLC not only
channeled federal funds away from black neighborhoods but was also responsible for a
much larger and more significant disinvestment in black areas by private institutions.").
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mendous suburbanization of the postwar period and in promoting mid38
dle class homeownership and wealth acquisition.
In income security too, Social Security's ultimate exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers transferred existing patterns of labor market segregation to the public system. The exclusion had grave effects because of the relative poverty of African Americans and their
overrepresentation in the lowest wage sector of the American labor
force.3 9 In effect, these design decisions reproduced the unequal private
labor market structure, inscribing it into federal program design,
The point here is not simply that the federal government interacts
passively to perpetuate longstanding inequality, but that federal programs
structure opportunities as part of state policy. Federal grant programs
not only permit these inequalities to exist but create the mechanisms that
sustain them. In this way, federal programs become implicated in generating racial and other forms of inequality.
These federal spending choices soon become hidden. Rendered invisible, the resulting landscape begins to seem natural and inevitable.
Federal decisions might have shaped the construction of suburbs, the
placement of highways, and the location of public housing, but the resulting physical, spatial structure is encompassing, and thus quickly begins to
seem preordained and fixed. 40 Racial meanings become cemented in
these created spaces. In his study of residential segregation in Detroit,
political scientist Thomas Sugrue notes that even as "blackness and whiteness assumed a spatial definition" in postwar cities, the federal policy decisions regarding public housing and urban renewal that produced this
segregation remained invisible. 4 1 Federally funded urban renewal programs displaced blacks, who were then concentrated in federally funded,
racially segregated public housing. 42 Racially discriminatory federal loan
38. See Keith, supra note 26, at 64 (noting substantial increase in 1946 in
construction starts and production of housing building materials was driven in part by the
Veterans' Emergency Housing Program); see also Katznelson, supra note 7, at 115-16
(observing that in immediate postwar period Veterans Administration mortgages paid for
nearly five million new homes and were especially important in high growth areas like
California, where they accounted for half of home mortgages by 1950); cf. id. at 116
("Residential ownership became the key foundation of economic security for the
burgeoning and overwhelmingly white middle class.").
39. See Katznelson, supra note 7, at 43 (noting majority of blacks at that time
occupied lowest sectors of labor market).
40. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, in In Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing & Education Policy
244 (John A. Powell et al. eds., 2001) (arguing "[r]ace-neutral policies, set against a
historical backdrop of state action in the service of racial segregation and thus against a
contemporary backdrop of racially identified space . . . predictably reproduce and
entrench racial segregation and the racial caste system that accompanies it").
41. Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in
Postwar Detroit 9 (1996).
42. See Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago,
1940-1960, at 170, 273-74 (1983) [hereinafter Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto]
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practices deprived blacks of access to suburban housing markets enabled
by the government-subsidized mortgage industry. 4 3 Yet these decisions
remained, as a practical matter, invisible to the public. Whites could see
"ghettoization" as "an inevitable, natural consequence of profound racial
differences." 44 Those residing in the "ghetto," though acutely aware of
the poverty and disinvestment that surrounds them, might thus fail to see
their communities as constructed by discriminatory government policies
and spending decisions. 45 Invisibility attends federal subsidies to create
private markets in particular. As historian Dolores Hayden notes in her
examinations of the discrimination embedded in federal housing and
loan programs, the racially tiered housing market was enabled by federal
policy, yet "mystified many working-class and middle-class Americans,
who saw minimal subsidies for the poor but never understood that their
own housing was far more heavily subsidized." 46 Historian David
Freund's recent account of federal policy on fair housing underscores the
manner in which the federal government itself promoted its mortgage
47
programs as market-driven rather than as products of federal spending.
This account of housing reveals how embedding racial outcomes and
obscuring federal spending's role in shaping racial outcomes become
mirror developments: As federal policy shapes segregation and patterns
of inequality, the funding and policy decisions often remain concealed to
beneficiaries and the broader public.
C. Structuring Citizenship
Federal spending programs can serve as key locations for advancing
conceptions of citizenship and inclusion. With regard to racial equality,
spending programs have manifested a dual nature. They have served to
include African Americans and other groups by establishing certain baseline protections and entitlements that apply to citizens regardless of race.
(describing effect of urban renewal in Chicago); Massey & Denton, supra note 13, at 54-57
(describing how federally funded urban renewal programs razed black neighborhoods and
shuttled blacks into high density housing projects with goal of "slum clearance").
43. See Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 36, at 199-201 (describing HOLC's
real estate appraisal practices).
44. Sugrue, supra note 41, at 9.
45. Susan Eaton's recent account of landmark civil rights litigation to address school
segregation and educational inequality in Connecticut articulates this well. Residents
rarely imagine themselves as "segregated"; rather, the spatial divide "seemed natural and
normal-a fact of life sustained by personal choice and housing costs, not by mandated
structures and systems. Segregation was hardly an 'issue' anymore." Susan Eaton, The
Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial 36-37 (2007).
46. Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth,
1820-2000, at 152 (2003).
47. See David M.P. Freund, Marketing the Free Market: State Intervention and the
Politics of Prosperity in Metropolitan America, in The New Suburban History 11-14 (Kevin
M. Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006). As Freund states, "[f]ederal intervention also
helped create and popularize a unique postwar political narrative that obscured the origins
of race and class inequality in the modern metropolis." Id. at 12.
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Yet, federal spending programs have also explicitly excluded African
Americans, or deferred to discrimination at the state and local level, thus
excluding blacks from the benefits of national citizenship.
New Deal and postwar spending programs provide powerful examples of how federal social welfare programs can advance and broaden the
meaning of American citizenship. New Deal programs embodied new assumptions about the national government's role in ensuring core economic security for citizens. Scholars have explored the extent to which
reformers at that time quite self-consciously sought to promote a new
constitutional vision of social citizenship, 48 and how as a practical matter
labor and economic security protections of the New Deal provided a
framework for racial rights claims. 49 Whether or not this citizenship
framework is explicitly constitutional in the formal sense, 50 the material
commitments manifested in federal spending programs function to establish a set of baseline protections that can be constitutive of citizenship.
These commitments are most visible in programs explicitly structured as entitlements, such as Social Security pensions. Nonentitlement
federal spending programs-such as federally funded public and subsidized housing or federal aid to education-can also function, albeit less
robustly, to advance baseline protections for citizens. One can understand nationalizing moves in elementary and secondary education in this
vein. Federal government support for education has steadily increased
since World War II, the key expansion of federal aid being the establishment in 1965 of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
48. See I Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 105 (1991) (discussing New
Deal as triumph of national citizenship over state citizenship); 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Transformations 279-344 (1998) (tracing historical development of New Deal
policies and interpreting their impact on society); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class & Equal
Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 66-70 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class]
(describing New Deal project in part as redefinition of citizenship in United States);
Forbath, New Deal, supra note 7, at 176 (exploring tradition of "social citizenship" in
constitutional discourse and its impact on New Deal proponents). Professor Forbath has
argued that the exclusion of blacks from the New Deal compromised reformers' broad
vision of advancing social and economic rights, thus contributing to omissions of social
citizenship from debates on the meaning of the Constitution today. See generally Forbath,
Caste, Class, supra at 21.
49. See, e.g., Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 142-43 (2007) (detailing
how Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude cases brought by Department ofJustice
to combat exploitation of black workers in 1930s "aimed to bring African Americans within
the New Deal rights framework"); Havard S. Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The
Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue 58-59 (1978) (stating that despite racial
discrimination perpetuated by New Deal programs, New Deal "played its part [in changing
racial relations] by substantively and symbolically assisting blacks to an unprecedented
extent, by making explicit as never before the federal government's recognition of and
responsibility for the plight of Afro-Americans, and by creating a reform atmosphere that
made possible a major campaign for civil rights").
50. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory "Constitution", 41 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1, 6 (2007) (arguing that administrative and legislative norms can create
constitutional norms not found in U.S. Constitution).
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(ESEA) to provide federal aid to poor students and Head Start. 51 Federal
policy involvement-specifically the use of federal funds to prompt
school reform at the state and local level-is most prominent in the 2001
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) .52
These measures reflect notions that providing a set of baseline educational protections are matters of national concern. To be sure, these
protections are not fully realized. NCLB announced its purpose to "ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to
obtain a high-quality education," 53 yet its financial support and program
for reforms may, as a practical matter, fall short of that goal. 5 4 The federal government also is a key source for funding low-income housing,
though housing is not federally guaranteed, nor are the budgetary allocations sufficient to meet the need. 55 Yet, the point here is that even these
imperfect interventions gesture toward citizenship.
51. See The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub. L. No.
89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). Precursors to
Title I include the 1946 National School Lunch Act, ch. 281, 60 Stat. 230, and the 1950
Impact Aid Act, ch. 1124, 64 Stat. 1100. In 1961, the federal share of education funding
increased to four percent of total K-12 revenues. After the establishment of Title I, federal
spending rose to about nine percent of K-12 education. See Maris A. Vinovskis, School
Reforms & Equal Education Opportunities for All Children: The Changing Federal Role
in Education 4 (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
52. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
NCLB requires that states report achievement data of different racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic groups, and take steps to reduce achievement disparities between groups.
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006) (describing Act's goal of "closing the achievement gap
between high- and low-achieving children, especially the achievement gaps between
minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more
advantaged peers").
53. 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
54. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality and National Citizenship, 116 Yale L.J. 330,
399-401 (2006) (discussing complexity in defining citizenship and highlighting failures in
remedial educational policies). There is considerable debate over the efficacy of NCLB's
reforms in the education and legal community. Compare James S. Liebman & Charles F.
Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights
Agenda, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1703, 1729-30 (2003) (identifying positive objectives and impact
of NCLB programs), with James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left
Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 959-60 (2004) (outlining negative consequences
associated with NCLB and countering supporters' arguments for its implementation).
55. Moreover, the Executive and Congress can change the scope of the citizenship
guarantee, as with regard to welfare, which changed from an entitlement program (Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)) to the current, more limited, Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. See Personal Responsibility and Work
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (detailing
provisions of TANF program in Title I). Eligible families can only receive TANF aid for
five years and many must now participate in work activities. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2006)
(establishing mandatory work requirements). In addition, the Act gives states great
flexibility to set eligibility criteria. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (directing states to submit plan
establishing objective criteria for delivery of benefits and determining eligibility).
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The converse is also true. Federal spending programs also determine citizenship through federal-level policy decisions on who to include
and who to exclude. The New Deal's original social security program
explicitly rejected universality in favor of exclusion of racially salient
groups. On its face, the program was nondiscriminatory, yet it was practically exclusionary in its design. Many of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
(FDR) New Deal reformers recommended that the social security program include all sectors of the labor market, including agricultural workers and domestic servants. 5 6 Yet, after intense congressional debate,
these workers were not included. 57 The effect of these design decisions is
to incorporate existing views about who is entitled to citizenship and to
further circumscribe citizenship.
More than simply reflecting ideals of citizenship, federal-level spending programs reflect specific, pivotal choices about whether to explicitly
advance national antidiscrimination requirements or, instead, to practice
what might be called strategic deference: structuring programs to allow
interstate variation in who gets included. Compelling examples are
found in the earliest New Deal relief programs, which provided immediate financial help to agricultural laborers, the poor, and the unemployed,
but which ceded power to states and localities in ways that accommodated
the racialized structure and caste system of the South. 58 Thus, although
the program was largely federally funded, some southern counties and

56. See Lieberman, Color Line, supra note 2, at 31 ("We cannot be satisfied that we
have a reasonably complete program for economic security unless some degree of
protection is given [to agricultural workers and domestic servants]." (quoting Comm. on
Econ. Sec., Need for Security (1935), at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces5.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review))). The Committee on Economic Security was
chaired by the Secretary of Labor and consisted of the Secretaries of Agriculture and the
Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Federal Emergency Relief Administrator. See id.
at 30.
57. To be sure, commentators have divided on the extent to which racial
discrimination motivated Social Security's occupational exclusions. See Gareth Davies &
Martha Derthick, Race and Social Welfare Policy: The Social Security Act of 1935, 112 Pol.
Sci. Q. 217, 218-20 (1997) (describing debate surrounding Congress's decision to exclude
agricultural and domestic workers); see also Lieberman, Color Line, supra note 2, at 30-31
(noting Committee on Economic Security was worried about administrability of program
as it related to domestic and agricultural workers); id. at 40 (discussing argument by
Treasury Secretary about administrative challenges of including agricultural and domestic
workers despite his support for inclusion on philosophical grounds). More recently,
historian Mary Poole has argued that southern congressional members were actually
divided over the question of excluding farmworkers because of the grave impact it would
have had on white southern laborers. Mary Poole, The Segregated Origins of Social
Security 44 (2006).
58. See Katznelson, supra note 7, at 36-37 (noting some Georgia counties excluded
all blacks from federal relief monies, while in Mississippi relief rates for blacks were under
one percent). These programs included the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), the
National Recovery Act (NRA), and the Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA). Poole,
supra note 57, at 7.

2011]

STIMULUS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

states effectively excluded all blacks from relief money.59 Other New
Deal programs such as the new Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program (ADC) similarly built state and local discretion into program
design in ways that maintained racial hierarchy. Thus, while ADC was
jointly funded by the federal government and by states, legislators allowed states to determine benefit levels and construct other requirements
60
which in southern states operated to exclude blacks.
Similar patterns are evident in the construction of deference in the
design of federal public housing programs and urban renewal programs,
which would serve to promote, in the end, racial segregation. In the initial formulation of the federal public housing program, the federal government sought to use eminent domain to acquire private property. After an appellate court ruled this maneuver beyond the federal
government's eminent domain power, 61 Congress redesigned the program so that public housing was owned and operated by local public
housing authorities (PHAs), with the capital costs paid by the federal government.6 2 The new legislative design granted deference to localities in
tenant and site selection, requiring the development of projects through

59. See Katznelson, supra note 7, at 37-38 (noting "ten southern states had lower
relief rates for rural blacks than whites" and "[i]n some Georgia counties ... federal relief
monies excluded all blacks"). Despite having broad powers, the FERA Administrative
Director succumbed to pressure from southern landowner interests to tailor benefit levels
so as not to interfere with their labor needs. See Michael K. Brown, Race, Money and the
American Welfare State 42 (1999).
60. See Katznelson, supra note 7, at 45-46 ("In the South... state governments used
their discretion, including provisions that an ADC home be 'suitable,' to reduce [African
American beneficiaries'] numbers."); Lieberman, Color Line, supra note 2, at 51-56
(discussing legislative debates surrounding Social Security Act and concluding southern
support for Act was contingent in part on belief that state discretion in administration of
Act preserved states' "right to maintain an economic and social system of segregation and
white supremacy").
61. See United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1935)
(finding Congress's power "does not carry with it the power here claimed, to condemn
private property to the end that appropriations of tax funds may be made for purposes
deemed by Congress to be for the public welfare").
62. See Keith, supra note 27, at 28 (detailing development of new system of providing
federal loans and grants to local housing authorities which was consistent with Constitution
and served to "foster local responsibility"); Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The
Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America,
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1285, 1291 (1995) (describing redesign of public housing program). As
Schill and Wachter explain:
Municipalities that wished to participate in the program would establish a PHA
and enter into an Annual Contribution Contract (ACC) with the federal
government. Under the ACC, the federal government funded the majority of the
capital costs of public housing by paying the debt service on long-term bonds.
The PHA, in turn, agreed to operate the housing over the life of the bonds,
subject to federal statutes and regulations.
Id. (citations omitted).
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cooperation agreements between local public housing authorities and lo63
cal municipal governments.
While the joint federal-state nature of the program might have been
required as a matter of constitutional doctrine in the arena of public
housing, 64 state and local authority became a powerful instrument for
segregation. Local government and local communities had tremendous
power in determining the location of public housing and, indeed,
whether it should be built at all. 65 The result was that public housing was
occupied on a segregated basis and few low-income housing projects were
built in middle class and white communities. 66 The effect of local cooperation agreements was also to tie the authority to develop public housing
to the existing, increasingly segregated urban-suburban boundaries. Local city housing authorities lacked the ability to develop housing in suburbs, and suburbs could effectively either allow only white-occupied
projects or, per the usual course, fail to develop public housing
altogether.

67

In the urban renewal programs that the federal government helped
to finance in the postwar period, deference and decentralization became
a way for both local and federal governments to avoid complying with
antisegregation norms that began to emerge at the time of the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.68 In the wake of the
Brown decision, federal bureaucrats in the Eisenhower administration reexamined discrimination in federal housing and subsidized loan programs. 69 The Eisenhower Administration's housing bureaucracy-quite
consistent with President Eisenhower's own dislike of the Brown deci63. See Hirsch, Difficult Barrier, supra note 28, at 58 ("Most important of all, the
[Wagner-Steagall Act] exhibited a deference to localism that meant that tenant- and siteselection remained in local hands, as did the decision as to whether or not a town would
choose to take advantage of the proffered assistance at all."); Alexander Polikoff, Housing
the Poor: The Case for Heroism 12 (1978) ("Local governments, therefore, had the power
to decide whether public housing was to be built at all in their communities and could
retain control, project by proposed project, over the place and pace of development.").
64. See Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d at 688 (finding acquisition of private
property for public housing program to be beyond eminent domain power of federal
government).
65. Polikoff, supra note 63, at 12.
66. See Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, supra note 42, at 10 ("Beginning in the
1930s, and continuing thereafter, the operation of national agencies such as . . . the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) reflected prevailing segregationist attitudes.");
Polikoff, supra note 63, at 12-13 ("More important, hardly any of the completed units were
built in white neighborhoods.").
67. See Polikoff, supra note 63, at 12-13 ("Suburban areas were, of course,
unavailable to central city housing authorities; the local cooperation agreement
requirement assured that the suburbs could ignore central city housing needs with
impunity." (citation omitted)).
68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69. Hirsch, Difficult Barrier, supra note 28, at 25-26 ("Once rendered, the Brown
decision sparked a flurry of self-examination among the housing agencies that consumed
the spring and summer of 1954."); id. at 70 ("Brown, potentially, called [the federal
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sion 7 0-resisted calls to reshape federal policies and programs to satisfy
Brown's requirements and, indeed, took actions that reinforced values of
local deference. Despite Brown, federal officials assumed that segregated
government housing would be the rule 71 and ignored both internal and
external critics who warned of the ghetto-expanding and hardening effects of federal programs. 72 Executive branch officials in the Eisenhower
Administration employed concepts of localism and decentralization to
justify their decisions not to require integration and desegregation in local housing programs. 73 Key officials in the Eisenhower Administration
argued that the national government had not caused residential segrega74
tion and, in the absence of federal legislation, had no power to end it.
Federal-level decisions about how to structure state and local discretion in the design of federal programs thus have tremendous implications
for racial inequality. This is not to suggest that arguments for deference
are always entangled with race, or in service of unfair racial ends. Questions about how to maintain state and local control in the face of increased federal funding and programmatic authority have salience even
apart from the question of race. 75 Yet the historical record of twentiethcentury programs reveals the practical and normative effect of decisions
about whether to federalize programmatic requirements and to establish
explicit antidiscrimination protections.
government's traditional deference to localism] into question, and at least threatened
great change.").
70. See id. at 70 ("The President's criticism of the Warren Court and the Brown
decision were well known as [was] his general distaste for the public discussion of racial
discrimination.").
71. See id. at 48-49 ("Despite the talk of open occupancy experiments and a handful
of 'integrated' projects, [the Eisenhower Administration] continued to adhere to preBrown racial policies.").
72. Hirsch describes the failure of the government to assign agents of the Race
Relations Service to field offices of the federal Urban Renewal Administration, giving
"[1]ocalities ...a virtual free hand to employ the new federal assistance not only to rebuild
aging neighborhoods, but to restructure their racial composition." Id. at 71. He further
notes that "[t]his became a particularly salient feature of the program in the wake of the
Supreme Court's action in Brown." Id.; see also id. at 41-47 (describing firing of Frank
Home, Administrator of the Racial Relations Service, and accompanying outrage from civil
rights and housing advocates); id. at 43 (noting criticism of federal housing policy by
George Weaver, acting chair of the National Committee Against Discrimination, and other
civil rights advocates); Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, supra note 42, at 226-27
(discussing African American critics of placing public housing in already segregated, poor
communities).
73. See Hirsch, Difficult Barrier, supra note 28, at 70-71 (describing extreme federal
deference to localism, particularly during Eisenhower Administration, and noting "[t]he
result was that local elites successfully hitched new federal power and supports to the
reinforcement (or establishment) of segregation").
74. See id. at 48-49 (describing positions taken by Albert Cole, head of Housing and
Home Finance Agency (HHFA) in 1950s, in defense of HHFA's noninterference with
residential segregation).
75. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 16-49 (discussing functional theory of federalism).
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REPEATING HISTORY?

These twentieth-century lessons on the specific mechanisms by which
federal spending creates racial exclusion are relevant to understanding
the civil rights and equal opportunity impacts of the stimulus. The aim of
this Part is to suggest key ways in which the Recovery Act bears on racial
equality. My focus is on programs involving education, housing, and
transportation, because of the role these federal programs have historically played in structuring racial inequality. Federal transportation and
housing programs are powerful contributors to the residential segregation that sustains contemporary racial inequality. 76 Education is examined less because of past federal complicity than because of the increasing federal involvement in education and the importance of
77
education in structuring opportunity.
To situate this analysis, the "stimulus" refers both to the specific congressional design of the Recovery Act of 2009, as well as to the implementation by both federal agencies and states of programs funded by the stimulus. It is possible to analyze the equal opportunity implications of the
legislative design of the stimulus, but how the stimulus is implemented in
the years to come will determine its ultimate impact. This Essay ultimately contends that key aspects of the stimulus entrench funding and
programmatic structures that promote racial inequality, defer to states
and localities rather than advance explicit civil rights rules and norms,
and miss key opportunities to innovate in ways that promote inclusion
and equity.
A. Overview of the Stimulus
The Recovery Act followed on the heels of smaller stimulus and economic relief efforts initiated in the last year of the presidency of George
W. Bush, including the Economic Stimulus Act of 200878 and the
76. See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Introduction, in The Geography of Opportunity 1,
3-8 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (detailing effects of urban sprawl and housing
options on racial and economic segregation).
77. The federal government had a more extensive involvement in education than is
often recognized. The post-Civil War Freedmen's Bureau was responsible for the
education of as many as 100,000 students each year, and the federal Department of
Education was established independently in 1867. Liu, supra note 54, at 371-75. As Liu
notes, soon after its establishment the Department was "demoted" to an office within the
Department of Interior, see id. at 374, and it did not become a cabinet-level agency until
1980. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., The Federal Role in Education, at http://www2.ed.gov/
about/overview/fed/role.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22,
2010). A major increase in the federal role, however, occurred with the passage of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
78. Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, enacted
February 13, 2008, created a range of economic initiatives to boost the economy, including
tax rebates, tax incentives for businesses, and provisions to allow government mortgage
agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase additional mortgages. The cost of the
Act was about $152 billion in 2008. Cong. Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 5140,
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Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 79 Even before assuming
office, President Obama began work on a stimulus package, and the bill
that would become the Recovery Act was introduced in the 111th
Congress in January 2009. The House introduced a bill on January 25,
2009,80 and passed it three days later on January 28.81 The Senate voted
through its own stimulus package on February 10, 2009, which provided
somewhat less in overall spending and more in tax relief 8 2 Conference
committee-approved versions of the bills ultimately passed each chamber
on February 13, 2009; and President Obama signed the bill into law on
February 17, 2009.83
In part, the stimulus depends on the controversial idea advanced in
the 1930s by John Maynard Keynes that government spending can revive
the growth of stalled market economies. 84 In so doing, the package also
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/
doc8973/hr5140pgo.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
79. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). The primary purpose of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was to
bail out foreign and domestic banks saddled with a range of troubled assets including
mortgage-backed securities. A key provision, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)
allowed the U.S. Department of the Treasury to purchase or insure up to $700 billion of
troubled assets in order to improve the liquidity of these assets. See 122 Stat. at 3767
(authorizing Secretary to establish TARP and "to purchase, and to make and fund
commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms
and conditions as are determined by the Secretary").
80. H.R. 1, ll1th Cong. (2009). The lead sponsor was the Chair of the House
Appropriations Committee, Representative David Obey (D-WI). Id.
81. See Jackie Calmes, House Approves $819 Billion Plan for Economic Aid, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 2009, at Al. Initially, 206 amendments were offered, but the Rules
Committee would eventually allow votes on just eleven amendments in order to expedite
the process and assure that amendments were germane and relevant to economic growth.
See Jonathan Allen, How 206 Stimulus Amendments Became 11, CQ Politics (Jan. 28,
2009, 6:22 AM), at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?doclD=news-000003019194
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
82. The Senate bill, S. 1, was introduced in the Senate on January 6, 2009 by Majority
Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). S. 1, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill passed the Senate by a vote
of sixty to thirty-eight, with three Republicans voting yes. See 155 Cong. Rec. S2312 (daily
ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (listing roll call vote).
83. Foon Rhee, With History and Flourish, Obama Signs the Stimulus Bill, Bos. Globe
Pol. Intelligence Blog (Feb. 17, 2009, 5:56 PM), at http://www.boston.com/news/politics/
politicalintelligence/2009/02/with-history.an.html
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
84. See Ike Brannon & Chris Edwards, Barack Obama's Keynesian Mistake, Nat'l Post
(Jan. 29, 2009, 7:00 PM), at http://network.nationalpost.com/NP/blogs/fpcomment/
archive/2009/01/29/barack-obama-s-keynesian-mistake.aspx (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing stimulus plan would fail due to its reliance on flawed Keynesian
premise that government spending will spur economic recovery). The Keynesian notion is
that, faced with major unemployment and sticky wages, increased government spending
will increase aggregate demand for goods and services, and hence reduce unemployment.
See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
27-32, 245-49 (Prometheus Books 1997) (1936) (detailing relationship between
consumption, investment and employment levels); see also Alan Brinkley, The End of
Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War 66 (1995) (describing as foundational
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aims to alleviate the immediate impact of the recession on individuals
and government institutions; launch government investments to fuel
longer-term economic growth by providing infrastructure investments in
transportation and environmental protection; and to promote "technological advancements in science and health."8 5 Job creation is at the Act's
core: President Obama's signing statement declared that the stimulus
86
package would "create or save 3.5 million jobs over the next two years."
Part A of the $787 billion stimulus package makes appropriations in
a broad set of federal programs.8 7 Part B consists of tax measures for
individuals, families, businesses, and educational institutions, as well as
for promoting job creation and for energy and health reform. 88 Central
to the stimulus are Part A's investments in housing, transportation, and
education. The following details some of the key programs and initiatives
funded by the Recovery Act.
1. Housing. - The Recovery Act provides over $13 billion for housing programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). These programs are designed to generate jobs,
make homes energy efficient, and help families and communities affected by the economic crisis. 89 Many of the programs are directed at
low-income and minority populations in particular.
a. Community Development Block Grant Program. - The Recovery Act
provides $1 billion for the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program, which helps state and local governments fund various
housing and community development activities in low-income neighborhoods.90 In the interest of economic stimulus, states and localities were
to the "'Keynesian approach'" the idea that public spending to spur consumption was the
best strategy for alleviating recession).
85. ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 3, 123 Stat. 115, 116 (2009).
86. See Remarks on Signing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in
Denver, Colorado, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 88 (Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter ARRA
Signing Statement].
87. ARRA, div. A, 123 Stat. at 116-305.
88. Id., div. B, 123 Stat. at 306-521.
89. Id., div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 203-26. The Act provides $288 billion in tax cuts.
The remaining $499 billion is for funding federal programs, as well as for federal contracts,
grants, and loans. See Recovery Accountability and Transparency Bd., The Recovery Act,
at http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/TheAct.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (providing high level breakdown of funding allocation).
90. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 217-20. "All activities, other than administrative
costs, must meet one of the CDBG's three national objectives: provide benefits to low- and
moderate income persons; eliminate slums and blighting conditions; or address urgent
needs and/or imminent threats within the community." U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., Program-Level Plan: Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Entitlement
Grants, at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/RECOVERY/PLANS/Community
%20Development%20Block%2OGrant%20(CDBG) %20Entitlement%20Grants.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). Ten million dollars of the
appropriation is directed to the Office of Public and Indian Housing's Indian CDBG
program. Id.
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required to give priority to projects able to award contracts within 120
days of the distribution of the funds. 9 1
b. Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program. The
Recovery Act provides $1.5 billion for the Homelessness Prevention and
Rapid Re-Housing Program (HPRP), aimed at homelessness prevention
assistance for at-risk households and rapid re-housing assistance for the
homeless. 9 2 The funds provide a variety of assistance, including "shortterm or medium-term rental assistance [and] housing relocation and stabilization services." 93 HUD awarded $1.2 billion of the funds in July
94
and in September 2009 HUD awarded the remaining $300 mil2009,
95
lion to almost 100 communities.
c. NeighborhoodStabilization Program.- The Act provides $2 billion to
help states, cities, nonprofits, and consortia of nonprofits in the redevel96
opment of abandoned or foreclosed homes and residential properties.
According to HUD guidelines issued in May 2009, grants are to be made
based on a number of selection criteria, including: greatest number and
percentage of home foreclosures; ability to expend at least 50% of the
funds within two years and 100% of the funds within three years; demonstration of capacity to execute projects; potential for leveraging; and con97
centration of investment to achieve neighborhood stabilization.
d. Public and Low-Income Housing and Rental Subsidies. The
Recovery Act appropriates $2 billion for rental subsidies to eligible tenant

91. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 217.
92. Id. at 221-22.
93. Id. at 221.
94. Henry C. Jackson, Housing and Urban Development Releases $1.2 Billion in
Stimulus Funds to Combat Homelessness, Associated Press, July 9, 2009, available at
Factiva, Doc. No. APRS000020090709e579001jm.
95. Press Release, Andrea Mead, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Donovan
Announces $300 Million in Recovery Act Funding to Prevent Homelessness (Sept. 23,
2009), at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/press-releases-media_
advisories/2009/HUDNo.09-181 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
96. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 217. The funds are available for five uses:
"establishment of financing mechanisms for purchase of foreclosed homes; purchase and
rehabilitation of abandoned or foreclosed homes; land banking of foreclosed homes;
demolition of blighted structures; and redevelopment of vacant or demolished property."
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Program-Level Plan: Neighborhood Stabilization
Program (NSP), at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/RECOVERY/PLANS/
Neighborhood%20Stabilization%2OProgram%20 (NSP).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (detailing funding, objectives, activities, characteristics,
schedule, and metrics for CDBG program).
97. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice of Fund Availability (NOFA) for the
Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, 2009, at 20-30, 68 (2009), available at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/
RECOVERY/programs/NEIGHBORHOODRESOURCES/Funding%2ONotice%20for%
20the%2ONeighborhood%2OStabilization%2OProgram%202.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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families. 98 The Recovery Act also provides $4 billion to be used by local
public housing authorities to develop and modernize public housing
units, demolish and replace ailing structures, and maintain existing
buildings. 99
In March 2009, HUD awarded almost $3 billion by formula to over
3,000 public housing authorities.1 0 0 HUD changed its funding guidelines
to allow more grant money to be spent in impoverished communities.10 1
HUD had initially stated that $100 million for major redevelopments
must be spent in census tracts where no more than 20% of residents lived
in poverty, but the agency soon increased the cap to 40%.102
The Recovery Act also appropriates $2.25 billion for a grant program
to provide funds for capital investments in stalled Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit projects, the largest federal program for creating low-income
rental housing.1 0 3 State housing finance agencies are required to commit 75% of their funds within one year of the enactment of ARRA and
must show that project owners have spent 75% of funds made available
10 4
within two years and 100% within three years.
98. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 222. HUD will use $2 billion to fund Section 8
contract renewals on a full twelve month cycle. Id.
99. Id., div. A., tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 214-15. ARRA requires that $3 billion of these
funds be distributed "by the same formula used for amounts made available in fiscal year
2008, except that the Secretary [of HUD] may determine not to allocate funding to public
housing agencies currently designated as troubled or to public housing agencies that elect
not to accept such funding." Id. In addition, public housing agencies must "give priority
consideration to the rehabilitation of vacant rental units" and to those "capital projects
that are already underway or included in the 5-year capital fund plans required by the Act."
Id.
100. See Press Release, Andrea Mead, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Makes
Nearly $1 Billion Available in Recovery Act Funds to Improve Public Housing (May 11,
2009), at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/press-releases-media_
advisories/2009/HUDNo.09-057 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In June 2009,
HUD announced that it was "lower[ing] the threshold that public housing agencies must
meet" to get a portion of the $1 billion in competitive funds. Initially, grants were available
only to "high performers"-housing authorities whose properties were in good physical
condition and well-managed. But after complaints by legislators that housing authorities
in many of the nation's largest cities would be ineligible for the funding due to poor past
performance, HUD decided that only half the funds in the first round of competitive
grants would be given to high performers. Kevin Freking, HUD Revises Rules for Stimulus
Money, Seattle Times, June 3, 2009, at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/
2009235970_apusstimuluspublichousing.btml (on file with The Columbia Law Review).
101. Freking, supra note 100.
102. See id.
103. HUD awards the Tax Credit Assistance Program funds by formula grant "to state
housing credit agencies to complete construction of qualified housing projects that will
ultimately provide affordable housing to an estimated 35,000 households." ARRA, div. A,
tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 220; U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Program-Level Plan: Tax
Credit Assistance Program (TCAP) [hereinafter TCAP Plan], at http://portal.hud.gov/
portal/page/portal/RECOVERY/PLANS/Tax%2Credit%20Assistance%20Program%20
(TCAP).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
104. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 220; TCAP Plan, supra note 103.
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2. Transportation.- The Recovery Act provides almost $50 billion
for transportation-related investments. 10 5 Most of the transportation
funding in ARRA is to be administered by the Department of
10 6
Transportation (DOT) and distributed through existing programs.
While all transportation funding is contingent upon states maintaining
existing spending levels, Federal Highway Administration funding is subject to the additional conditions that half of the funds be obligated within
120 days of apportionment, and that priority for funding be given to
projects "located in economically distressed areas" that can be completed
10 7
within three years.
More than half ($27.5 billion) of the funds are allocated to the
Highway Infrastructure Investment Fund to support highway and bridge
10 8
construction, repair, and maintenance, as well as rail and port projects.
Further, the Act allocates $8 billion to improve and develop intercity
high-speed rail service, 10 9 and $6.9 billion to enhance public transit
programs. 110
3. Education. - The Recovery Act's major investments in education
take place through the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) which, as
discussed further below, attempts to help states meet current budget
shortfalls while promoting executive branch-driven policy reform.
a. State FiscalStabilizationFund. - The SFSF is a one-time appropriation of $53.6 billion to help state education programs cope with the recession and advance education reform. 11' Of the amount appropriated, the
U.S. Department of Education (DOE) will award states approximately
$48.6 billion by formula grant 1 2 in exchange for states' commitment to
105. Id., div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 203-14.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 206-07, 212-14. To constitute an economically distressed area, an area
generally must (1) have "a per capita income of 80 percent or less of the national average";
or (2) have "an unemployment rate that is, for the most recent 24-month period for which
information is available, at least 1 percent more than the national average unemployment
rate." 42 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (2006). For areas that fail to satisfy either of these criteria, the
Secretary of Commerce can decide that an area has experienced or will experience "a
special need arising from actual or threatened severe unemployment or economic
adjustment problems resulting from severe short-term or long-term changes in economic
conditions." Id. Another $1.5 billion will be competitively awarded to states, local
governments, and transit agencies for capital investments in highways and bridges, public
transportation, and rail. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 203-12.
108. See ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 206. The program will fund projects
eligible under the Surface Transportation Program. 23 U.S.C. § 133 (2006).
109. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Star. at 208.
110. Id. at 209; see also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Public
Transportation Apportionments, Allocations and Grant Program Information, 74 Fed.
Reg. 9656 (Mar. 5, 2009) (providing guidance for formula grants to be distributed through
"Federal Transit Administration ...assistance programs"). The Recovery Act gave Amtrak
$1.3 billion for capital improvements. ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 209.
111. ARRA §§ 14001-14013, 123 Stat. at 279-86.
112. A formula grant program is a noncompetitive grant to states administered
according to a formula. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Formula Grant Definition, at
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advance specific educational reforms. 113 Up to $5 billion remains available for the Secretary of Education through the competitively awarded
1 14
Race to the Top and Innovation Fund programs.
Two-thirds of the $48.6 billion in funds are distributed in a first
phase, in which states receiving awards must pledge to advance education
reform in four areas: increasing teacher effectiveness and addressing inequities in the distribution of highly qualified teachers; establishing and
using a system to track student progress; making progress toward establishing college- and career-ready standards and high quality assessments;
and supporting interventions for improving and restructuring failing
schools.1 15 DOE will distribute the remaining one-third of the $48.6 billion when states provide data on their progress in the above reform areas
16
and make that data publicly available.'
b. Race to the Top Fund. - The Recovery Act makes $4.35 billion
available for the Race to the Top Fund, a competitive grant program designed to encourage and reward states that are creating the conditions
for education innovation and reform.' 1 7 A state must describe the status
of the state's progress in each of the four reform areas addressed above
with respect to SFSF funds. 1 8 In addition, a state's application must also
http://www2.ed.gov/fund/grant/about/formgrant.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). By contrast, an agency awards discretionary grants to
states on a competitive basis. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Discretionary Grant Definition, at
http://www2.ed.gov/fund/grant/about/discgrant.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010); see also Kamina Aliya Pinder, Using Federal Law to
Prescribe Pedagogy:
Lessons Learned From the Scientifically-Based Research
Requirements of No Child Left Behind, 6 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 47, 53 (2008) (describing
Department of Education's grant process).
113. ARRA §§ 14001-14005, 123 Star. at 279-83.
114. Id. §§ 14006-14007, 123 Stat. at 283-84.
115. Id. § 14005(d), 123 Stat. at 282-83; U.S. Dep't of Educ., Guidance on the State
Fiscal Stabilization Fund Program 3-4 (2009), available at http://www.ed.gov/programs/
statestabilizatioin/guidance.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22,
2010). As described above, a state seeking stabilization funds must provide an assurance
that it will establish a longitudinal data system that has the capacity to link preschool, K-12,
postsecondary education, and workforce data. ARRA makes a separate, non-SFSF
allocation of $250 million available in the form of grants to states to develop and
implement these systems, which will enable states to monitor student- and teacher-related
reforms and make particular changes to advance them. See ARRA, div. A, tit. VIII, 123
Star. at 183-84 (funding Institute of Education Sciences); see also Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., Statewide Longitudinal Data Systems, available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/
slds/factsheet.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010)
(describing elements of data systems).
116. See State Fiscal Stabilization Fund Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,837-41 (July 29,
2009) (establishing data reporting requirements for grant recipients). States are not
required to demonstrate progress in the reform areas in order to get funds, but they have
to ensure that the data regarding their progress is available to the public. Id.
117. ARRA § 14006, 123 Stat. at 283-84; Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Race to the
Top, available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/factsheet.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
118. ARRA § 14005(c), 123 Stat. at 282.
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detail steps it is taking to improve the achievement of disadvantaged
groups (such as racial minorities), improve graduation rates, address the
needs of high-need school districts, and close the racial and ethnic
achievement gap. 119
A key requirement of the Race to the Top Fund is that states permit
the establishment of charter schools, without placing caps on their number or otherwise restricting student enrollment in these schools. 120 The
DOE awarded grants to two states in March 2010121 and awarded the remaining grants to ten applicants in August 2010.122
c. Additional EducationProvisions.- The Recovery Act establishes an
Investing in Innovation Fund that provides $650 million in competitively
awarded grants to expand education programs that improve K-12
achievement and close achievement gaps, decrease dropout rates, increase high school graduation rates, and improve teacher and school
leader effectiveness. 123 The Recovery Act also provides an additional
$200 million for the DOE's Teacher Incentive Fund, which supports
grants to school districts that establish compensation systems providing
teachers and principals in high-need schools with differentiated levels of
compensation based on student achievement gains, as well as on class124
room evaluation.

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Delaware received $100 million in funding; Tennessee $500 million. Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Delaware and Tennessee Win First Race to the Top Grants
(Mar. 29, 2010), at http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2010/03/03292010.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
122. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Nine States and the District of Columbia
Win Second Round Race to the Top Grants (Aug. 24, 2010), at http://www.ed.gov/news/
(on file
press-releases/ninestates-and-district-columbia-win-second-round-race-top-grants
with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing award of grants to District of Columbia and
nine states-Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Rhode Island).
123. ARRA § 14007, 123 Star. at 284; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Secretary
Duncan Releases Application for $650 Million to Support Innovation (Mar. 8, 2010), at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-duncan-releases-application-650-millionsupport-innovation (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
124. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Teacher Incentive Fund, at
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/factsheet.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). The goals of the Teacher Incentive Fund are:
"improving student achievement by increasing teacher and principal effectiveness;
[r]eforming teacher and principal compensation systems so that teachers and principals
are rewarded for increases in student achievement; [i]ncreasing the number of effective
teachers teaching poor, minority, and disadvantaged students in hard-to-staff subjects; and
[c]reating sustainable performance-based compensation systems." U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
Teacher Incentive Fund, at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/index.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
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B. Stimulus and Equity
Drawing on the lessons of the New Deal and postwar spending programs, this Part considers the ways in which stimulus programs risk producing and reproducing racial inequity. The purpose of this section is
not to make an empirical assessment that the stimulus will actually harm
African Americans or other groups. Rather, it is to suggest that the stimulus has the power to create racial harm and, second, that to avoid that
harm, equity advocates must rely not only on the familiar tools of legal
advocacy, but also on a range of new structures that have emerged to
monitor federal spending.
1. Scale. - As noted in Part 1,125 the size of the stimulus is an important starting point for examining its potential impact on racial inequality.
Much like the New Deal, the stimulus provides a large, concentrated
burst of federal funding and programming. The stimulus buttresses existing federal programs that have long proved important in providing for
social welfare and infrastructure needs. For instance, low-income housing and transportation programs are heavily dependent on federal government funding. 12 6 The stimulus also creates new programs. In particular, its initiatives in education 127 have the potential to restructure the
delivery of education at the state and local level, and expand federal control. 128

2. Structuring Citizenship. - A next question is whether the Recovery
Act might, by design, exclude certain groups from the benefits of federal
programs. Today, as at the time of the Great Depression, African
Americans, Latinos, and other racial minorities are more likely to be lowincome, to have been disparately affected by this latest recession, and to
be particularly reliant on the state institutions and social welfare programs that are facing budget strain. 129 The Recovery Act provides a set of
125. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
126. In low-income housing, for instance, the federal government funds programs to
help maintain and revitalize public housing. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437c(a), 1437i (2006)
(detailing funding for capital costs for public housing); Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2473 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437) (creating "HOPE VI" program to revitalize public housing). It also operates the
country's largest program for creating low-income rental housing. See Philip D. Tegeler,
The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs, in The Geography of
Opportunity, supra note 76, at 197, 201 (describing Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Program and arguing that it "has operated with little civil rights oversight"). Through a
variety of programs, the federal government has provided seventy-five to ninety percent of
the funding for urban mass transit programs and the interstate highways since the 1950s.
See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the Federal Government
Play, 36 Urb. Law. 475, 485 n.71 (2004).
127. See supra Part II.A.3 (detailing various education initiatives under ARRA).
128. See Steven Brill, The Teachers' Unions' Last Stand, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2010, at
MM32 (detailing dramatic education reforms and shifting power balances as states pursue
Race to the Top Fund grants).
129. See Amanda Logan & Christian E. Weller, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The State of
Minorities: The Recession Issue (2009), at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
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immediate increases in federal funding to stem the recession's immediate
impact, as well as to shore up public institutions in a range of areas such
as health, education, and housing. 130 Because of the disproportionate
need in minority communities, many of these programs can be expected
to directly benefit minority individuals. In addition, several Recovery Act
programs are specifically targeted at minorities and women, including
funding for transportation-related job training focused on "minorities,
women and the socially and economically disadvantaged" and for disadvantaged businesses. 13 1 In transportation, the Recovery Act funds new
high-speed rail programs to better link metropolitan areas in ways that
may prove useful in breaking down the economic and geographic isola13 2
tion of low-income African Americans.
The most significant set of innovations are those promoting racial
equity in education. States applying for funding from the State Fiscal
Stabilization Fund must implement a range of improvements in educational quality, including addressing inequities in the distribution of
highly qualified teachers to high poverty and minority schools. As noted
above, competitive grants are available to promote other federally backed
1 33
initiatives.
To be sure, political and practical challenges may curb education
innovation in implementing the stimulus. In addition to the persistent
difficulty of reforming K-12 education, the education measures lay bare
the challenges of innovating in a time of recession. Initial evidence suggests that some states are using stimulus funds to fill budget shortfalls
rather than adopting new federally mandated reforms (in part because
state budget shortfalls in education were larger than initially forecast).134
Another impediment is that the reforms are themselves contested. States
2009/01/state -of minorities.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
minorities' particular vulnerability to economic downturns).
130. See ARRA Signing Statement, supra note 86 (describing recovery plan as first
step in economic recovery process by saving jobs and investing in education, health care,
and technology).
131. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 111-16, at 94, 470 (2009) (allocating $20 million for
highway surface transportation and technology training, $20 million for disadvantaged
business enterprises bonding assistance, and additional set asides for "on-the-job training
programs focused on minorities, women, and the socially and economically
disadvantaged").
132. See Mark Muro et al., Brookings Inst., Metro Potential in ARRA: An Early
Assessment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 20-21 (2009) [hereinafter
Muro et al., Metro Potential] (discussing $53 billion budgeted for transportation
improvements in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, $9.5 billion of which will go
toward passenger rail projects).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 117-124.
134. See Michael A. Rebell et al., Stimulating Equity?: A Preliminary Analysis of the
Impact of the Federal Stimulus Act on Educational Opportunity 6-13 (2010), available
at http://www.equitycampaign.org/i/a/document/1285 7 -Stimulating-Equity-ReportFINAL.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding SFSF has proved useful in
stemming effects of recession but few of twenty surveyed states have used funds to promote
reforms); see also Alyson Klein, Dual Aims in Stimulus Stir Tension, Educ. Week, June 10,
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and education stakeholders might disagree on a range of issues such as
the efficacy and desirability of boosting charter schools,1 35 how to administer merit-based pay for teachers, and the impacts of such changes on
136
student performance.
In short, several important programs in the stimulus seek to advance
racial equity. These measures are significant because they do not accede
137
to the claimed universalism that attended some New Deal programs.
Rather, they self-consciously harness federal spending power to promote
racial equity reform.
However, much as in past programs, the Recovery Act embodies decisions about when to defer to states and localities and when to condition
funding on the adoption of equality norms or goals.
The most compelling examples are in housing. The Recovery Act
increases investments into the federal government's largest program for
creating low-income rental housing, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) program, augmenting capital funds to LIHTC programs that
have stalled because of the recession. 138 One question has been whether
the LIHTC program must adopt civil rights rules that limit HUD's ability
to site public housing in areas of high poverty and concentrated minority
populations. The Treasury Department's Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), not HUD, administers the LIHTC, and has so far declined to adopt
regulations to promote integration in site selection.1 39 Even as the
2009, at 1, 24 (noting states face tension between using stimulus funds for reform purposes
and using them to fill preexisting deficits).
135. Researchers disagree on the benefits of encouraging more charter schools.
Compare Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., A Closer Look at Charter Schools Using Hierarchical
Linear Modeling, at vi (2006) (analyzing 2004 and 2006 data and finding traditional public
schools outperform charter schools on reading and math standardized tests), and Steven
M. Ross et al., Achievement and Climate Outcomes for the Knowledge Is Power Program in
an Inner-City Middle School, 12J. Educ. for Students Placed at Risk 137, 137 (2007), with
Erik W. Robelen, KIPP Success Cited, with Caveats, Educ. Week, Nov. 12, 2008, at 5
(reporting on study findings that students in charter schools tend to perform better,
although noting rigorous programs of charter schools may select out less motivated or
prepared students and their families).
136. See Alyson Klein, Budget Would Boost Incentive Pay, Turnaround Aid, Educ.
Week, May 13, 2009, at 20 (detailing concerns of critics of incentive pay systems).
137. See supra text accompanying note 56 (describing New Deal's effect of defining
and circumscribing citizenship). ProfessorJohn Powell has called this "false universalism."
John A. Powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 785, 791-92
(2009) (arguing "Social Security Act, often described as the quintessential universal policy,
was universal, only insofar as the universal was a white, male, able-bodied worker").
138. The Recovery Act provides $2.25 billion in capital investments for the LIHTC
program through grants to state housing finance agencies under the HOME Investment
Partnership Program. ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. 115, 220-21
(2009). The portion of the program that is funded as a grant should be covered by Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4a (2006), as well as by Title VIII of
the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608, but HUD has not made clear the civil rights
requirements of these provisions.
139. As discussed earlier, the stimulus also advances civil rights with respect to LIHTC
by mandating for the first time that state housing finance authorities collect data on the
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Recovery Act extends funding for this program, Congress did not include
civil rights rules that would prohibit the expansion of racial segregation.
Without federal- and state-level rules promoting integration, the program
is likely to continue its current pattern, and to thus result in expanding or
140
maintaining prior segregation.
A similar example is the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, which
provides grants to states and localities to purchase abandoned and foreclosed property.14 1 This program stands to benefit African Americans
and Latinos disproportionately affected by the foreclosure crisis, since it
targets neighborhoods with the highest rates of foreclosure. 142 The program helps minorities by allowing foreclosed property (which is often located in high-poverty neighborhoods) to become new housing for lowincome renters. As in the LIHTC program, however, Congress did not
mandate that recipients of federal subsidies have opportunities to live in
low-poverty, predominantly white areas.1 43 Without explicit civil rights
race and ethnicity of residents of LIHTC developments. Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2835, 122 Stat. 2654, 2874-75.
140. Cf. Carissa Climaco et al., Abt Assocs. Inc., Updating the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit (LIHTC) Database: Projects Placed in Service Through 2006, at 55-57 (2009),
available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/Climaco_[1]_LIHTC%20through%20
2006.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding "tax credit units are more likely
than households in general or rental units in general to be located in high poverty areas"
and "more likely to be located in tracts with large minority populations or large
proportions of female-headed households, compared to households in general or rental
units in general"); Jill Khadduri et al., Abt Assocs. Inc., Are States Using the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit to Enable Families with Children to Live in Low Poverty and Racially
Integrated Neighborhoods? (2006),
available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/
LIHTCreport_- 2006.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing study of "the
extent to which each of the states administering the tax credit program has used the
program to place rental housing in" low-poverty, racially integrated neighborhoods);
Tegeler, supra note 126, at 202 & n.20 (finding LIHTC program "mirrors existing
conditions of racial and economic segregation" in many states and citing testimony of Fair
Housing Center of Greater Boston before Massachusetts Department of Housing and
Community Development stating "almost two-thirds of LIHTC projects within Boston are
very heavily concentrated in census tracts whose residents are predominantly black and
Hispanic" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Studies also reveal the program's great
potential to promote mixed-income, racially integrated neighborhoods. In a few regions,
the program appears to be encouraging the development of low-income housing outside
of poor, minority areas. See, e.g., Khadduri et al., supra, at 11-21.
141. On January 14, 2010, HUD awarded $1.93 billion under the Recovery Act's
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (known as NSP2). U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2, at http://hud.gov/offices/cpd/community
development/programs/neighborhoodspg/arrafactsheet.cfm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last updated Apr. 12, 2010).
142. See ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 217-18 ("[I]n selecting grantees, the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall ensure that the grantees are in areas
with the greatest number and percentage of foreclosures.").
143. Courts and federal agencies have interpreted the Fair Housing Act's provisions
that require federal agencies and grant recipients to affirmatively further fair housing as
mandating that federally subsidized housing be sited in low-poverty, nonminority areas.
See infra Part III.B. Under ARRA, NSP2 funds are treated as Community Development
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guidance, this new program is likely to follow the pattern of other federal
low-income housing programs that reproduce segregation, and that fail
to provide opportunities for minorities to live in low-poverty
neighborhoods. 144
These two instances parallel legislative and administrative failures for
much of the twentieth century to explicitly require civil rights protection
in federal public housing. The harmful impacts of these programs occur
not through explicit exclusion, but through legislative and administrative
silence. This silence can perpetuate existing patterns of race and class
14 5
segregation in housing.
3. Embedding Inequality? - Important aspects of the Recovery Act
threaten to deepen patterns of racial inequality by continuing and expanding the harmful funding and institutional structures of the past century. The question is one of risk because, at least in some programs, federal and state level policymakers could make decisions about how to
implement these programs, and could establish rules that would mitigate
the potential harms of these programs. A compelling manifestation of
the possibility of entrenching existing patterns of inequality is in the
Recovery Act's emphasis on "shovel ready" projects. This is key to the
economic thinking behind the stimulus-emphasizing immediate federal
spending to deliver a quick economic boost.' 46 Indeed, some of the explicit conditions that the Recovery Act places on federal spending are to
ensure that the money is spent quickly. 147 Yet "shovel ready" is often in
tension with goals of inclusion.
For one, "shovel ready" emphasizes infrastructure-related jobs, an
area that suffered severe job losses.1 48 The construction trade, however,
Block Grant (CDBG) funds, which are governed by explicit civil rights objectives. See 42
U.S.C. § 5301 (stating CDBG's goal of promoting neighborhood "diversity and vitality,"
reducing isolation of low-income groups, and increasing "spatial deconcentration" of lowincome individuals).
144. See supra note 140 (detailing data from LIHTC program).
145. No doubt the relevant equity norm is more contested here than in the area of
civil rights protections in public housing programs in the 1950s. The fair housing goal of
integration is frequently in tension with the goal of creating affordable housing
opportunities in high-poverty neighborhoods. See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and
Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1747, 1803-04 (2005) [hereinafter Orfield, Racial
Integration] (noting tension between duty to affirmatively further fair housing and LIHTC
siting preferences).
146. See, e.g., Letter from Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President, to David Obey, Chairman of House Appropriations Comm. (Jan. 27,
2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
legislative-letters/obey_012709.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (urging direct
federal boost to lift nation out of recession).
147. See ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 203-214 (setting obligation schedule for
ARRA transportation funding).
148. See Bracken Hendricks & Matt Golden, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Taking on the
Tool Belt Recession 1-4 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
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has historically underrepresented blacks and women. 149 Thus, in the absence of intervention to change hiring patterns in that industry, the
Recovery Act's heavy emphasis on construction jobs may exclude African
Americans, women, and other vulnerable groups.
In addition, the Recovery Act emphasizes infrastructure projects that
are underway or already planned, again for the worthy goal of providing
urgent economic improvements. 1 50 Yet, these choices devote considerable federal funds to buttressing transportation policies that helped produce residential and economic segregation. Transportation is the largest
of the Recovery Act's infrastructure funding programs. While the
Recovery Act requires that the money be used in economically distressed
areas, more than half of the funding goes to the Surface Transportation
Program. 151 This creates incentives to build highway and transportation
networks that have long had the effect of concentrating poverty and racial groups, and which do little to enhance regional cooperation between
majority-minority and poor cities, struggling inner ring suburbs, and low152
poverty suburbs.
Indeed, the speed of spending deemed necessary to achieve the economic recovery goals of the stimulus is in tension with rethinking funding
structures and with redesigning programs in ways that might promote racial inclusion. At the metropolitan level, regions have been experimenting with integrating suburban and city transportation and housing
programs with huge implications for bridging the spatial divide that has
proved deleterious to neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.' 5 3 Yet the
stimulus funnels its funds through separate programmatic funding
streams, and apportions funds between state, county, and local governments, which does little to encourage experiments in bridging program2010/03/pdf/construction.jobs memo.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(finding unemployment rate for construction workers was 24.7% in January 2010).
149. See, e.g., Kris Paap, How Good Men of the Union Justify Inequality: Dilemmas
of Race and Labor in the Building Trades, 33 Lab. Stud. J. 371, 376 (2008) (documenting
underrepresentation of blacks and women in construction trades and role of labor unions
in preserving discriminatory status quo); Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The
Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial Discrimination in
Construction, 19 Pol. & Soc'y 291, 292, 300 (1991) (asserting "persistence of
discrimination in construction is not simply an unpleasant exception to the general case").
150. See ARRA, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 204, 206 (requiring priority funding be
given to transportation projects that can be completed in three years).
151. See Muro et al., Metro Potential, supra note 132, at 20 (noting half of
transportation infrastructure funds are channeled through Surface Transportation
Program).
152. See id. at 10, 20 (finding that in twenty-three states' plans only half of funding
would go to largest metropolitan areas, where minorities disproportionately reside).
153. See, e.g., Brookings Inst., MetroPolicy: Shaping a New Federal Partnership for a
Metropolitan Nation 36-37 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/
Files/rc/reports/2008/06_metropolicy/06_metropolicy-fullreport.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing efforts in Denver, New York, and Portland to better
coordinate regional transit systems and address affordable housing needs across
metropolitan areas).
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matic areas, or to allow governance innovation at the metropolitan
level.'

54

The speed of spending can operate to exclude small and disadvantaged businesses, including those run by minorities and women in transportation development programs. The Recovery Act requires states to
use fifty percent of their transportation funds within 120 days of apportionment, and to give funding priority to projects that can be completed
within three years. 15 5 Additionally, many transportation projects are subject to longstanding federal affirmative action requirements. 1 56 Yet, in
part because of the priority placed on quick disbursement of funds (as
well as some states' emphasis on funding rural projects), some states 57are
1
failing to meet goals for equitable hiring of minorities and women.
C. Implications
This account reveals the potential effect of specific stimulus programs on racial inequity. Ultimately, this Essay does not claim that the
stimulus will necessarily lead to racial harm, but seeks to point out specific
154. See Mark Muro et al., Brookings Inst., Implementing ARRA: Innovations in the
Design in Metro America 8-9 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/
Files/rc/reports/2009/0723_americanrecovery-reinvestment act/0723_american
recovery-reinvestment act brief.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing few
provisions would allow creative communities to link, align, or mix even obviously related
funding flows to achieve synergistic effects).
155. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-09-926T, Recovery Act: States' Use of
Highway and Infrastructure Funds and Compliance with the Act's Requirements 2 (2009).
156. See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1101(b), 119 Stat. 1144, 1156-57
(2005) ("Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, not less than 10
percent [of certain transportation programs] ... shall be expended through small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.");
49 C.F.R. § 26.21 (2009) (requiring recipients of federal highway funds and those receiving
certain planning and capital grants above $250,000 to participate in disadvantaged
business program); id. § 26.3 (listing statutes subject to disadvantaged business enterprise
requirement); see also 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (2006) (defining "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals" while presuming minority businesses meet definition).
157. See, e.g., Letter from Will Kempton, Dir., Cal. Dep't of Transp., to Transp.
Constr. Cmty. (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/bep/documents/
DBEAnnouncement-Construction.y4_.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (urging
state transportation community to meet federal targets for disadvantaged contractor
hiring); Aaron Glantz, Minority Contractors Unite to Demand Share of Stimulus Dollars,
New Am. Media, July 23, 2009, at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/viewarticle.
html?articleid=fed888cd4172f69e3283d024371a4008 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting minority and disadvantaged contractors have failed to receive substantial
share of contracts even though California law banning affirmative action does not apply to
stimulus contracting); Jason Hoppin, MnDOT Shorting Disadvantaged Firms on Stimulus
Projects, Report Says: But MnDOT Predicts More Work for Disadvantaged Firms, Pioneer
Press, Oct. 14, 2009, at http://www.allbusiness.com/society-social/religion-spiritualityreligion/13201054-1.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Minnesota
Department of Transportation has failed to meet state goal of fifteen percent
disadvantaged contractor participation rate in construction projects).
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areas in which the stimulus risks reproducing and entrenching forms of
racial inequality by excluding particular groups from full participation in
the benefits of federal programs. Given these risks, policyiakers and equity advocates should think about the stimulus's broad economic recovery goal as an occasion to interrupt, rather than reproduce, patterns of
inequity and to advance social inclusion. The goal here is to suggest that
the stimulus-particularly given its size-should prompt a set of questions about federal spending programs' effects on equity. These questions include who benefits from federal spending, and how federal spending operates to shape patterns of equality in various communities.
These questions should be part of the executive and legislative design of federal spending programs. But, as a practical matter, it is too late
to reshape the stimulus's essential design. Instead these questions remain
relevant to the federal administrative agencies implementing the stimulus, as well as to state and local governments that will spend stimulus
funds. In the next Part, this Essay examines the capacity of legal tools
and norms to prompt governments to examine the equity effects of federal spending.
III.

STIMULUS AS CIVIL RIGHT

This Part turns to the question of how civil rights tools might help
ensure racial equity in the current stimulus, as well as interrupt the
broader institutional pathways and mechanisms identified in Part 1.158 At
the time of the New Deal, civil rights reformers sought to draw attention
to the potential adverse impact of the new federal spending programs on
African Americans. 159 They voiced concerns to the President and his executive team of New Deal proponents, to Congress, and to the public
about the exclusion of black workers from Social Security and the deference granted to states under many New Deal programs. 160 For the most
part, their lobbying efforts were unsuccessful. African Americans had littie electoral power or influence in Washington at that time, and national
civil rights groups like the NAACP and the National Urban League were
relatively new and still politically weak. 16 1 Their efforts had difficulty
finding political traction: Civil rights groups were in the midst of a
higher visibility campaign to enact a federal antilynching law with the
help of FDR's New Deal allies. 162 Moreover, many in the black community and in FDR's Roosevelt coalition did not react favorably to criticisms
158. See supra Part .B-C.
159. See Poole, supra note 57, at 97-139 (recounting lobbying efforts of NAACP,
National Urban League, and Joint Committee on National Recovery to eliminate
discriminatory provisions of New Deal federal spending programs).
160. See id. at 116-39.
161. See id. at 130-39 (detailing NAACP's simultaneous efforts to define its legal
agenda and pressure Congress for inclusion of African Americans in Social Security Act).
162. See id. at 108-11 (describing NAACP's efforts to generate support for
antilynching legislation).
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of federal programs that, in the main, vastly expanded support for blacks
163
suffering from the Depression.
The landscape has now changed. The civil rights movement of the
1960s mobilized minority communities and strengthened the political
power of African Americans and national civil rights groups. 164 National
antidiscrimination law emerged in the 1960s and provides baseline statutory antidiscrimination protections as a fundamental right of citizenship. 165 These laws harness expanded federal power created by New Deal
and postwar spending programs to advance antidiscrimination norms.
Indeed, the civil rights laws that condition federal spending are-at least
in theory-among the most powerful civil rights laws because of the
breadth of federal spending and the potential financial consequences to
grantees for noncompliance.1 66 Specifically, Tide VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and particular provisions of the federal Fair Housing Act provide significant, if underenforced, mechanisms for advancing equity and
interrupting the reproduction of inequality in federal spending
programs. 167
What this Part suggests, however, is that, beyond the antidiscrimination law of the 1960s, the stimulus is generating a new model for promoting equity in federal spending that seeks to respond to the complex, multiple ways in which spending programs might exclude particular groups
and advance larger notions of citizenship and inclusion. Because of the
magnitude of the investments of the stimulus, and its self-conscious goal
of reshaping the delivery of many state and local services, the stimulus has
prompted a set of new interventions to promote accountability in how
these funds are spent. Rights and equity groups have begun to use these
new transparency tools and technology (1) to map the racial and ethnic
impacts of federal spending, and (2) to make equity claims on spending
at the federal, state, and local levels. These emerging efforts may not be
immediately recognizable as law, since they do not center on court enforcement. Yet they seek to advance equity claims by harnessing laws requiring transparency in stimulus spending, race and ethnicity data collection requirements, the monitoring capacity of new state and local
163. See id. at 130-39 (noting that although "New Deal programs provided many
African Americans, for the first time, genuine and substantial federal support through
emergency relief," civil rights groups faced difficulty of contesting exclusion without
alienating white liberal supporters of Social Security Act).
164. See Peter Skerry, Racial Politics in the Administrative State, Society, Jan./Feb.
2005, at 38 (noting mobilized black community and stronger public interest politics were
key legacies of social upheavals during 1960s).
165. See Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of
National Policy 1960-1972, at 467 (1990) ("The civil rights laws of 1964, 1965, and 1968,
with their nationwide bans on discrimination in public facilities and accommodations, and
private jobs and housing, became politically unassailable."). Cf. id at 190-210 (noting
EEOC's role as "subversive bureaucracy" in civil rights and women's rights movements).
166. See infra notes 171-181 and accompanying text (analyzing civil rights laws as
weapons against state discriminatory action).
167. See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
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government entities created in the wake of stimulus, and the "hard" law
principles of Title VI and the Fair Housing Act.
A. AntidiscriminationBaseline
Weeks after the President signed the Act, the White House Office of
Management and Budget (the office responsible for preparing the
President's budget and supervising its implementation 168 ), developed a
set of guidelines to govern disbursement of stimulus funding. 16 9 The guidance included the directive that all executive branch departments and
agencies involved with disbursing stimulus funds distribute their funds in
accordance with "antidiscrimination and equal opportunity" statutes that
apply to federal contracts, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.170
The inclusion of this explicit language in the guidance is likely for
emphasis; technically such a specification should be unnecessary. Title VI
has long forbidden discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity in
federally funded programs, applying to federal agencies and departments
as well as recipients of federal financial assistance. 171 And other statutory
civil rights protections govern federal spending programs, including the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which forbids disability discrimination in fed168. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Open Government
Plan, at i (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/100407-omb-opengov-plan.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("OMB's
central mission . . . is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation and
implementation of the Federal Budget and to oversee and coordinate the Administration's
legislative, management, performance management, and regulatory policies.").
169. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.
Office of the President, to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies § 1.6, at 7 (Feb. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.recovery.gov/About/Documents/Initialrecoveryactimplementing
guidance-febl8.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
170. See id. at 7. Section 1.6 of the guidance provides:
1.6 What additional responsibilities exist for Executive Branch agencies?
The Executive Branch shall distribute Recovery Act funds in accordance with:
All anti-discrimination and equal opportunity statutes, regulations, and Executive
Orders that apply to the expenditure of funds under Federal contracts, grants,
cooperative agreements, loans, and other forms of Federal assistance. Grantmaking agencies shall ensure that their recipients comply with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, and any
program-specific statutes with anti-discrimination requirements. Generally
applicable civil rights laws also continue to apply, including (but not limited to)
the Fair Housing Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Uniform
Relocation Act.
Id.
171. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin in any "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2006).
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eral agencies and in programs receiving federal financial assistance; 172
Title IX, which forbids gender discrimination in federally funded programs or activities;' 7 3 and the Age Discrimination Act, enacted in 1975,
which forbids age discrimination by recipients of federal financial
74
assistance.1
In conditioning federal spending on state and local compliance with
antidiscrimination rules, Tide VI represented a "watershed" moment in
American history. 175 The most immediate trigger was the failure of states
and localities to comply with desegregation requirements following
Brown,176 but the statute expansively applies to all programs and activities
receiving federal funds.' 77 In introducing the bill, President Kennedywho had not long before resisted notions of cutting off funds to segre-

172. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
173. Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
174. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107.
175. See Stephen C. Halpern, On the Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 1 (1995) ("Heralded as 'one of the legislative milestones in
modem American history' ... the 1964 Civil Rights Act was a watershed event in American
law and politics."). The roots of conditioning federal spending to advance civil rights stem
from efforts in the New Deal and postwar period. In the 1930s, President Roosevelt, and
his officials, harnessed executive power to combat discrimination, issuing an executive
order prohibiting employment discrimination in federal agencies, see Exec. Order No.
8802, 3 C.F.R., ch. 2, at 234 (Supp. 1941) (prohibiting racial, ethnic and national origin
discrimination against workers in defense industries and in government); Exec. Order No.
7046, microformed on CIS No. 1935-EO-7046 (Cong. Info. Serv. 1935) (forbidding
discrimination in newly established Works Progress Administration (WPA)); Sitkoff, supra
note 49, at 321 (discussing Executive Order 8802, which also established Committee on
Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) in Office of Personnel Management to administer the
order). Harold Ickes, President Roosevelt's long-serving Secretary of the Interior, "insisted
that the Public Works Administration (PWA) construction projects hire [blacks] as skilled
as well as unskilled laborers" despite the fact that the statute was silent on the question of
discrimination. Id. at 66-67. He also required that all PWA contractors hire a percentage
of blacks equal to blacks' proportion in the 1930 occupational census. See id. at 67
(noting provision was sometimes ignored by local officials and contractors). Congress in
1939 amended the New Deal's Emergency Relief Act to prohibit discrimination by relief
officials on the ground of "race, creed, or color." Id. at 69. President Eisenhower in 1951
extended prohibitions on employment discrimination to recipients of federal contracts.
See Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 C.F.R. § 4899 (1953) (banning discrimination by
contractors on federally financed construction sites); Goluboff, supra note 49, at 42 ("In
1953, even Eisenhower, a reluctant supporter of African American civil rights, followed the
by then decade-long precedent of taking executive action to eliminate discrimination in
government contracting.").
176. See Charles F. Abernathy, Tide VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for
Defining "Discrimination," 70 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (1981) ("Congress passed tide VI during a
period of intense concern with public school desegregation.").
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination in any "program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance"); see also Kenneth Wing, Title VI and Health
Facilities: Forms Without Substance, 30 Hastings L.J. 137, 152 & n.56, 153 n.58 (1978)
(documenting legislative concern with prohibiting discrimination in health care,
particularly in hospital services).
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gated schools systems I 7 8-advanced a capacious notion of federal responsibility, stating that "[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which
all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
179
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination."
Title VI's language forbidding "discrimination" was not defined by
Congress,1 80 and federal agencies quickly interpreted that provision to
prohibit not just intentional discrimination but practices that created an
unjustified disparate impact.1 8 1 In forbidding both intentional discrimination and actions with a disparate impact by all federal grantees, Title VI
would appear to provide a forceful tool for legal advocates seeking to
ensure racial fairness in the use of federal stimulus funds.
Enforcement of Title VI, however, faces important practical constraints. For one, Title VI has operated most clearly as a prohibition on
intentional discrimination. Title VI's disparate impact regulations have
not provided a consistently effective mechanism for ensuring that federally funded programs are attentive to racial impacts in program design
and implementation. 182 In part this is because courts have often declined to enforce capacious understandings of Title VI that might move
178. President Kennedy and other members of Congress initially opposed the idea of
withholding federal aid, as an affront to localism in education, and as a potentially
dangerous accumulation of federal power. See Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of
Southern Education: The Schools and the 1964 Civil Rights Act 31-32 (1969).
179. 109 Cong. Rec. 11,178 (1963). Twenty years later, the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission, the federal agency charged with issuing reports and recommendations on the
federal enforcement of Tide VI and other civil rights provisions, would describe the statute
as intended to "demolish the lingering barriers to full participation faced by minorities,"
and argue that these "barriers are the legacy of legally mandated or tolerated segregation
and discrimination, and, experience has shown, can be dismantled only with the
leadership and assistance of the Federal Government." U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights,
Federal Civil Rights Commitments: An Assessment of Enforcement Resources and
Performance 2 (1983).
180. Title VI does not define the prohibited discrimination, but, in section 602 of the
Act, it directs agencies that distribute federal funds to "effectuate" the regulations by
issuing "rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability." Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78
Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1). Congress required presidential
approval of the regulations, and also directed that the regulations be "consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance." Id.
181. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2) (2009) (proposing regulations by Justice
Department that would prohibit "arrangements ... which have the effect of subjugating
individuals to discrimination"); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (3) (2009) (establishing Department of
Health and Human Services regulations prohibiting "mak[ing] selections . . . with the
purpose or effect of defeating... the objectives of the Act or this regulation"). The first
regulations promulgated under Title VI-drafted in 1965 by the same executive branch
officials who contributed to the drafting of the statute-included regulations extending
the statute to practices having a racially discriminatory effect. Cf. Comment, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 824, 845-46
(1968) (explaining how Justice Department officials compiled agency plans for
implementing Title VI).
182. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 396-401
(2007) (discussing difficulty in enforcement of Title VI's prohibition on disparate impact).
The Supreme Court essentially curtailed judicial enforcement of Title VI's disparate
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federal agencies and grantees to broadly evaluate the effects of their
spending programs.1 8 3 And, more recently, the Supreme Court's 2001
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval1 8 4 cut off the use of an implied private
right of action to enforce Title VI's effect regulations.1 8 5 Second, agency
enforcement of Tide VI has produced mixed results in promoting a robust requirement that agencies and their grantees take affirmative steps
to assess racial impacts and to avoid harmful racial effects. Since courts
have not clearly defined a particular norm, agencies feel no compunction
to advance one. 18 6 In the absence of strong judicial enforcement of Tide
VI's disparate impact regulations, most federal agencies have not adopted
meaningful elaborations of the disparate impact requirement. While federal agencies adopted the Title VI effects test, few have done much work
to elaborate what sorts of disparate impacts are unjustified in federal
spending programs, much less to advance the larger notion that grantees
18 7
affirmatively consider or correct racial impacts.
impact standard. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001) (holding Title VI's
disparate impact regulations are not privately enforceable).
183. A telling example is an early disparate impact case in which the Second Circuit
declined to interpret Title VI to require the City of New York to consider less
discriminatory alternatives to closing a hospital that served a predominantly minority
population. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding Title VI,
unlike Title VII, did not require courts to consider less discriminatory alternatives as Title
VI's breadth would mean such an inquiry would be too "open-ended" and thus beyond
capacity of courts).
184. 532 U.S. at 293. For a critique of the Court's decision in Sandoval, see Pamela
H.S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 183, 198-99
(arguing that Court improperly framed issue as whether Title VI created individual rights,
rather than allowing private parties to enforce federal regulations, and failed to consider
that at time of Title VI passage Congress would have assumed private lawsuits would be
central pillar of enforcement, even in absence of express right of action).
185. Following the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (holding § 1983 analysis of whether Congress intended to create
enforceable right is no different than in implied right of action cases), lower courts have
declined to find the effects regulations enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., S. Camden
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
§ 1983 could not be used to enforce disparate impact regulations).
186. Early enforcement of Title VI to mandate school desegregation often mirrored
relatively weak judicial standards. See Halpern, supra note 175, at 72-75 (noting agency
tasked with enforcing Title VI had "standards [that] . . . were little more than the
requirements of the Constitution as federal judges had interpreted those requirements").
Indeed, when the Department of Education adopted requirements to promote school
integration that went beyond remedying intentional, explicit exclusion, critics faulted the
agency for arbitrarily interpreting the statute and for going beyond what federal courts
required. See id. at 54-57 ("Critics maintained that in mandating the percentages of
students who had to be in desegregated schools, HEW had exceeded its authority under
Tide VI.").
187. Johnson, supra note 182, at 401, 414 & n.176. There have been some instances
of attempted formal rulemaking under Title VI to enforce an affirmative norm. For
instance, the Environmental Protection Agency in 2000 issued draft guidance advising
funding recipients to affirmatively consider racial impacts in the operation of their funding
programs, but this draft guidance was never formally adopted. See Draft Recipient
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Even with these limitations, Tide VI has potential to serve as an
important tool for equity advocates seeking to shape the spending of
stimulus funds. In February 2010, for example, the Federal Transit
Administration denied $70 million in stimulus funds to Northern
California's public transit agency after local groups filed an administrative Tide VI complaint claiming that the regional transit agency had
failed to conduct an adequate environmental review or to properly ser1 88
vice minority communities.
B. Duties to Affirmatively Further
Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which requires that federal agencies and their grantees work to "affirmatively ... further" 189 the
goals of the Fair Housing Act, also promotes equity in federal spending.
Additionally, because it creates affirmative requirements for grantees,
Tide VIII can, at least in the area of housing, operate to counter the
complex harms and institutional arrangements generated by federal
spending programs. 190
The relevant provisions of the Fair Housing Act require the federal
government to take steps to administer its "programs and activities relating to housing and urban development ... in a manner affirmatively to
further the purposes of [the Fair Housing Act]."191 These provisions
arise in the Fair Housing Act precisely because of legislative recognition
of the role federal government spending played in structuring segregation through federal grant programs, and the perceived inadequacies of
Tide VI. 192 In response, the Act places on the federal government an
affirmative and forward-looking duty unusual in civil rights law.
Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,657 (June 27, 2000) (providing guidance regarding
environmental permitting programs).
188. See Complaint Under Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 & Executive Order
12,898 at 17-23, Urban Habitat Program v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (Dep't of Transp.
Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://issuu.com/transform/docs/fta_ title-vi-complaint_09-109_final (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (alleging failure to "comply with Title VI
and Environmental Justice requirements"); see also Press Release, Pub. Advocates, On Eve
of Stimulus Anniversary, Obama Administration Denies Funds Due to Civil Rights Failures
(Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://www.publicadvocates.org/news/documents/Transit/
FlTA_NadRelease_021610.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Obama
Administration's reaction to alleged Title VI violations).
189. Fair Housing Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e) (5) (establishing requirements to affirmatively
further fair housing goals).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d).
192. Because it prohibited racial discrimination in federally funded programs, Title
VI covered public housing and other government-subsidized programs. Even prior to Title
VI, President Kennedy's 1963 executive order required federal agencies to take
appropriate action" to abandon discriminatory practices in federal housing programs.
Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 261 (Supp. 1962), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
app. § 1982. Civil rights groups argued that both were insufficient: The executive order
was not well enforced by federal agencies, see, e.g., Civil Rights: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 3296, Part 2,
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This affirmative duty arises because, unlike Tide VI, which was driven
primarily by notions of state and local complicity-that is, their failure to
comply with Brown's dictates-the drafters of Title VIII sought to correct
federal responsibility for creating residential segregation patterns. 193 Indeed, while the legislative record contains little discussion of the specific
"affirmatively to further" language,' 9 4 what emerges is a new theory of
how the federal government should now function in relation to states and
localities. No longer would it be permissible for the federal government
to practice what this Essay has called "strategic deference."' 9 5 Now the
federal government was to leverage its considerable spending power to
affirmatively address discrimination and segregation.
For this provision to be powerful in requiring federal grantees to
consider how federal programs might further housing segregation, its
scope and the consequences for noncompliance had to be clear. Yet, this
was not the case. Courts in the 1970s authorized judicial review through
an implied right of action or under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 196, and defined it expansively to require that the federal government refrain from racial segregation in site selection and instead create
opportunities for poor minorities to live in low-poverty, majority white
89th Cong. 1430-31 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 S. Hearings] (statement of Jack E. Wood,
Associate Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing)
("This massive misuse of federal funds [for projects that reinforce segregated housing
patterns] flows from a lack of firm and determined action by the Secretary of HUD... to
affirmatively implement Executive Order 11063 . . . ."), and Title VI failed to require

agencies to undertake affirmative remedial measures. See Citizens Comm'n on Civil
Rights, A Decent Home: A Report on the Continuing Failure of the Federal Government
to Provide Equal Housing Opportunity 16-25 (1983) (detailing structural weaknesses and
lack of enforcement of Kennedy's executive order); Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping
the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Federally Financed
Housing, 48 How. LJ. 913, 913-14 (2005) (arguing Title VI was "not an effective
interdiction of racial discrimination and segregation").
193. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearing on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280
Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency,
90th Cong. 6 (1967) (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att'y Gen. of the United States) ("[T]he
Federal Government fostered discrimination in housing . . . ."); see also Orfield, Racial
Integration, supra note 145, at 1767-68 (noting in debates surrounding the FlA several
lawmakers alleged direct government role in segregation and proposed strengthening
provisions of Title VI); Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing
in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42
Wake Forest L. Rev. 333, 389 (2007) [hereinafter Roisman, Regional Housing Markets]
("HUD's role in creating the problem was fully recognized by Congress; the 'affirmatively
further' language was included specifically to address that.").
194. Similar language appeared in the Civil Rights Bill first introduced by President
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966, and was retained when-after a long struggle-the Fair
Housing Act was eventually enacted in 1968. See Roisman, Regional Housing Markets,
supra note 193, at 389 (discussing intended purpose of "affirmatively further" language).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 58-75 (discussing both local and federal
governments' use of deference to "avoid complying with antisegregation norms").
196. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
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neighborhoods. 197 Yet, as the Supreme Court's private right of action law
has changed, 198 some courts have held that the provision is not privately
enforceable, 199 and courts disagree on the extent to which the provision
requires grantees to further integrate federally funded housing
programs200
197. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299 (1976) (holding regional remedy was
appropriate because "the wrong committed by HUD confined the respondents to
segregated public housing. The relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents'
housing options is the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits"); id. at 301-02
("An order directing HUD to use its discretion under the various federal housing
programs to foster projects located in white areas . . . would be consistent with and
supportive of well-established federal housing policy."); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503
F.2d 930, 938 (7th Cir. 1974) (discussing duty to promote integration); Shannon v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 816, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding HUD
liable for constructing low-income subsidized housing in area with already high
concentrations of poor minorities, which violated HUD's duty to affirmatively further fair
housing in "non-ghetto areas" with lower race and poverty concentrations). Shannon
involved the construction of Section 221 public housing, also known as project-based
Section 8. The court read the affirmative duty to further in conjunction with Title VI. See
Shannon, 436 F.2d at 817; see also NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149,
155 (1st Cir. 1987) (authorizing review pursuant to APA and holding the statute requires
"that HUD do more than simply not discriminate itself... [but] use its grant programs to
assist in ending discrimination and segregation to the point where the supply of genuinely
open housing increases").
198. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002) ("[W]here the text and
structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual
rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right
of action.").
199. See, e.g., Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King, 36 Conn. L.
Rptr. 422 (Super. Ct. 2004), affd 890 A.2d 522 (Conn. 2006). For a discussion of the
problems of enforcing the FHA's affirmatively furthering provisions pursuant to § 1983,
see generally Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Note, Opening Doors to Fair Housing: Enforcing
the Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 2135 (2010). The judicial enforcement strategy recently bore some fruit
with the August 2009 settlement of a case against Westchester County for failing to comply
with the duty to affirmatively further. The settlement stemmed from an August 2006
complaint which, unlike the Connecticut case, did not claim a direct right to enforce the
statute. Instead, the plaintiffs-the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York
(ADC)-brought a qui tam action on behalf of the federal government claiming that
Westchester County had, over a six-year period, received over $50 million dollars in HUD
funds under the Community Development and Block Grant program, in violation of the
False Claims Act, by falsely certifying each year that it was affirmatively furthering fair
housing. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). After a district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, HUD decided to intervene to secure a
settlement in the case. Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Its Application to Intervene at 7, Anti-DiscriminationCenter, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (No. 06 Civ.
2860). In the end, the brokered settlement required Westchester County to create more
than $50 million in affordable housing in predominantly white areas of the county. Sam
Roberts, Housing Accord in Westchester: Seeks to Desegregate Mostly White Towns, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 2009, at Al.
200. See In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified
Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 13-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (reviewing and
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Yet, even with these limitations, civil rights groups have been able to
mobilize at the administrative level to shape housing programs in part
because of the legislature's push to promote integration within federal
housing programs and early court decisions interpreting an affirmative
duty to integrate.
An example of successful mobilization to enforce the affirmatively
furthering requirement can be found in a recent agency notice to potential grantees under the Recovery Act's Homelessness Prevention and
Rapid Re-Housing Program, which provides $1.5 billion for communities
to prevent homelessness among at-risk individuals and families and funds
20 1
to help those who become homeless transition to stable housing.
HUD's recent notice of requirements for funding grantees specifies that
grantees must comply not only with antidiscrimination requirements
under Title VI, but with the duty to affirmatively further fair housing, not
simply with respect to race, but with respect to other categories covered
by the FHA as well (i.e., gender and disability). 20 2 Significantly-and in
contrast to HUD's prior funding notices-HUD delineates the types of
specific actions that meet this affirmative duty, including affirmatively
marketing programs to people with disabilities, providing fair housing
counseling and referral to fair housing agencies, and recruiting landlords
and service providers in a range of communities so as to promote housing
203
choice.
In short, the FHA's "affirmatively furthering" requirement stands as
the best statutory embodiment of an affirmative federal duty to consider
racial impacts and promote equity outcomes in federal spending. As a
practical matter, however, determining how to enforce the principle in
courts, and to promote it outside of courts, is fraught with difficulty.
These enforcement limitations are borne partly out of the Supreme
applying various tests for "establishing a discriminatory impact in a Title VIII case" and
holding that agency's "'affirmatively to further' duty must be defined congruent with its
statutory powers"); Orfield, Racial Integration, supra note 145, at 1784-90 ("Although
agencies administering [housing] program[s] are bound by the duty [to further
integrate], substantial disagreement remains as to the scope of that duty and its
importance in relation to other statutory commands." (footnote omitted)); Kenneth H.
Zimmerman, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and Civil Rights Law:
Updating the Fight for Residential Integration, in Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal., The
NIMBY Report, Fifty Years Later: Brown v. Board of Education and Housing Opportunity 24,
24-31 (2004), available at www.nlihc.org/doc/2004-1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit and noting "the
most troubling aspects of the decision concern its failure to provide any substance,
content, or standards to the 'affirmatively to further' mandate").
201. See ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. 115, 221-22 (2009).
202. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice of Allocations, Application Procedures, and
Requirements for Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program Grantees
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Docket No. FR-5307-N-01, at
41-42 (2009), available at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/RECOVERY/
nofa-portlet/hrp-notice.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
203. See id. at 42.
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Court's doctrines on implied private rights of action for Spending Clause
legislation and the amorphous nature of the statutory requirement. They
also result from, more broadly, the willingness and competence of courts
to decide between conflicting goals for federal spending (such as integration versus affordable housing development).2°4 Thus, while the principle extends beyond Title VI's nondiscrimination goals in important ways,
shaping the meaning of the federal government's duty will be as much
the domain of administrative and programmatic mobilization as it is the
domain of the courts.
C. Spending and Racial Inclusion
However, the challenges that exist to advancing equity in federal
spending through the longstanding civil rights framework are not insurmountable. The stimulus itself holds new promise for using law and legal
frameworks to promote racial equity. The stimulus is spurring new forms
of regulating and monitoring federal spending, which though not all specifically aimed at questions of race or social inclusion, provide an avenue
for advancing racial equity. In particular, the current push toward increasing transparency in federal spending, and the new state agencies
created to administer and monitor stimulus spending, present a new opportunity for advancing the goals incompletely realized by civil rights statutes. The stimulus contains new legislative rules and executive branch
regulations to promote transparency, 20 5 which equity advocates could leverage to provide new forms of equity accountability. These efforts can
build on notions in Title VI and Title VIII that federal funds should not
entrench or subsidize racial inequity, yet more fully realize these statutes
by creating a more expansive and inclusive process of enforcement and
accountability.
1. "Transparent"Spending. - President Obama repeatedly invoked
the goal of improving government transparency and accountability both
as a general matter and in relation to the Recovery Act and government
spending programs in particular. On his first day in office, the President
signed a memorandum expressing his commitment to an "unprecedented level of openness" so as to promote accountability, enhance gov20 6
ernment efficacy, and encourage public participation in democracy.
The President also instructed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to issue an Open Government Directive. 20 7 In December 2009,
OMB issued its directive, encouraging agencies to employ a variety of
204. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
205. President Obama has repeatedly sounded the open government theme as an
executive branch goal, stating that the ARRA will be implemented "with an unprecedented
level of transparency and accountability." See ARRA Signing Statement, supra note 86.
206. Executive Office of the President, Transparency and Open Government:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685
(Jan. 26, 2009).
207. Id.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:154

mechanisms to promote "transparency, participation and collaboration."20 8 The Directive required that each federal agency designate,
under the direction of the White House, a high-level senior official to be
20 9
accountable for the quality of information on federal spending.
Beyond asserted executive-level commitment to transparency, a
range of legislative rules attempt to advance the goal of transparency in
the Recovery Act in particular. By statute, the Recovery Act establishes
the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency Board to prevent fraud,
mismanagement, and waste, and to track for the public how Recovery Act
210
funds are used by states, local governments, and private recipients.
The Board must issue quarterly and annual reports on its oversight findings and provide advice to government agencies. 21 ' Significantly,
the Recovery Act also requires that the government create and maintain a "user-friendly, public facing" website, which is now at
www.recovery.gov. 2 12 A visit to www.recovery.gov reveals, among other
things: background on the stimulus, visual maps on the geographic location of Recovery Act funds, data on jobs created including by geographic
location, and opportunities for citizens and groups to apply for stimulusfunded jobs and grants.2 13 In addition, each federal agency has a web
page tracking spending under the Recovery Act. While leading government watchdog groups have noted shortcomings in the Administration's
implementation of these transparency measures, they have praised this
2 14
strong emphasis on transparency.
208. Office of Mgmt. and Budget, M-10-06, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Open Government Directive 1 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda._2010/mlO06.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
209. Id. at 3-4.
210. See Recovery Accountability & Transparency Bd., Mission Statement, at
http://www.recovery.gov/About/board/Pages/TheBoard.aspx (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) ("The Recovery Accountability and Transparency
Board was created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ....").The
Board is chaired by Earl E. Devaney, who was appointed by President Obama, and includes
twelve federal Inspectors General from various government agencies. Recovery
Accountability & Transparency Bd., Board Members, at http://www.recovery.gov/About/
board/Pages/BoardMembers.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct.
23, 2010). In addition, President Obama appointed Vice President Joe Biden to oversee
implementation of the stimulus plan. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y,
Vice President Biden to Oversee the Administration's Implementation of the Recovery
Act's Provisions (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press .. office/
Vice-President-Biden-to-Oversee-the-Administrations-implementation-of-the-Recovery
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
211. Recovery Accountability & Transparency Bd., Power and Functions, at
http://www.recovery.gov/About/board/Pages/PowersFunctions.aspx
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
212. ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1526, 123 Stat. 115, 293 (2009).
213. See Recovery.gov, at http://www.recovery.gov (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
214. See, e.g., OMB Watch, Recovery Act Transparency: Implementation and
Current Issues 18 (2009), available at http://www.accountablerecovery.net/sites/default/
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These legislative and executive transparency and accountability measures on spending build on past initiatives that emphasize increased public reporting of federal spending and that understand web technology as
a key tool for promoting transparency and accountability. 215 The most
comprehensive of these is the Federal Funding Accountability and
Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), which requires OMB to provide access to information on federal funding awards through a searchable, pub216
licly available website, which was established at usaspending.gov.
State governments also have implemented a variety of accountability
and transparency measures. Although not required by the Recovery Act,
President Obama requested that states name "czars" to oversee their
share of funds from the stimulus package. 217 Over a dozen states have
appointed such "czars," while others have created boards tasked with coordinating and monitoring Recovery Act expenditures. 2 18 After urging
from the White House, states created websites dedicated to tracking and
providing public information on spending under the Recovery Act. 219
Nongovernmental organizations are building on the technology of
transparency and using transparency and accountability as a frame for
evaluating the stimulus. Groups representing a variety of interests-good
government, civil rights, labor, environment-are creating their own webfiles/Transparency%20in%20the%2Recovery%2OAct.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (expressing "guard[ed] optimis[m]" about new transparency and accountability
measures but suggesting specific improvements in what data is collected and in public
dissemination of that data).
215. See, e.g., David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11
Yale J.L. & Tech. 160, 161 (2009) (advocating government's role as information provider
to ensure "private parties [can] compete on equal terms").
216. Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-282, § 2(b), 120 Stat. 1186, 1187. The FFATA builds on prior efforts to increase
accountability and public availability of information on federal spending. See, e.g, EGovernment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2919-20 (codified as note to
44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)) (requiring OMB to develop and maintain repository and website
that provides information about research and development funded by federal
government); Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-107, 113 Stat. 1486 (codified as amended as note to 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006))
(requiring each federal agency to create and implement plan for reporting agency's
disbursement of federal funds).
217. See Pamela M. Prah, Downturn Creates State Spending Czars, Stateline.org (Apr.
9, 2009), at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/storycontentld=391122 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing creation of "state stimulus 'czars'").
218. Id. (noting that states with budget or chief operating officers include Idaho,
Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington).
219. See Philip Mattera et al., Good Jobs First, Show Us the Stimulus (Again): An
Evaluation of State Government and Recovery Act Websites 1 (2010), at http://
www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/ARRAwebreportjan20lO.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("Every state government has a website reporting on its role in implementing the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. .. ").
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sites to monitor and track the stimulus as well as monitor the sufficiency
220
of federal and state transparency efforts.
2. Civil Rights Accountability. - These transparency innovations provide new possibilities for responding to the complex ways, detailed in Part
I, through which federal spending risks reproducing racial inequality.
These new approaches innovate by (1) promoting a set of new metrics for
advancing racial inclusion at the state and local levels, (2) using spending
as a focus for advancing citizenship and inclusion claims, and (3) making
visible the racial impacts of federal spending.
a. Broadening Equity Metrics. - The administrative and legislatively
established transparency and accountability measures described above
are geared to the monitoring of fraud and waste, and not to questions of
civil rights. Thus, data is often not compiled or collected in a way that
permits a race or gender equity analysis. As an example, OMB's guidance
for Recovery Act grant recipients does not specifically require tracking
race and ethnicity at the employee level. 2 21 Still, in some areas, the stimulus establishes new types of race- and ethnicity-specific data collection
that equity advocates can employ to bolster efforts to monitor racial impacts. For instance, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act requires,
for the first time, data collection of the racial and ethnic occupancy of
projects developed pursuant to certain federally subsidized housing programs, allowing nongovernmental organizations to buttress current efforts to evaluate the extent to which the developments are providing ac22 2
cess to minorities and furthering integration.
Civil rights interests can organize around this and other available
data. Federally funded contractors must meet goals for hiring small, disadvantaged, and women- and minority-owned businesses, 223 which has
resurrected long-standing debates about the propriety of affirmative ac-

220. E.g., Coalition for an Accountable Recovery, at http://www.coalitionfor
anaccountablerecovery.org/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 23,
2010); ProPublica, Eye on the Stimulus, at http://www.propublica.org/ion/stimulus (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010); States for a Transparent
and Accountable Recovery, at http://www.accountablerecovery.org/
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010); see also Mattera et al., supra note 219
(evaluating state government websites).
221. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Webinar, Prime Recipient Reporting (July 22,
2009), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Webinar 5_ARRARecipient.
Reporting_.--PrimeRecipient9l.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
reporting requirements tied to receipt of ARRA funding).
222. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-289, sec. 1125,
§ 1324, 122 Stat. 2654, 2693-95.
223. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965) (prohibiting
discrimination and requiring affirmative action for most contractors and subcontractors
with federal contracts involving more than "specified amounts of money or specified
numbers of workers").
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tion 224 as well as allowed significant civil rights innovations. Building on
data, minority groups in several states have criticized state agencies for
225
insufficient hiring of minority contractors with federal stimulus funds
while, on the other hand, California is facing lawsuits from white contractors for violating state-based prohibitions against affirmative action. 226 In
short, in those areas in which civil rights and race-related data is available,
interest groups and nongovernmental organizations can build on the government's own transparency and accountability efforts to provide an account of race and gender disparities in federal funding beneficiaries.
No doubt, producing metrics for broad concepts such as equity, inclusion, and fairness in federal spending will often be contested. Disparities in quantifiable areas, such as racial or gender disparities in stimulus
job creation, might be amenable to measurement and benchmarking. By
contrast, the effect that spending on roads, public transit design, and
housing has on particular groups may be more difficult to quantify.
Moreover, the claimed "equity" goal may itself be contested. As we have
already seen in the context of enforcing the FHA's duty to affirmatively
further, the statutory mandates and the equity norms may be in conflict:
Expanding affordable housing might be in tension with promoting racial
22 7
and economic integration.
Rather than a limitation, the challenges in defining equity present
an opportunity for governments and stakeholders to develop a more textured set of metrics for evaluating the impact of federal spending than is
required under current civil rights law. In addition to easily quantifiable
markers such as the racial, ethnic, or gender disparities in job creation,
metrics might seek to evaluate whether transportation networks are designed to connect historically disadvantaged groups to areas of economic
opportunity, or whether affordable housing development promotes
neighborhood revitalization as well as racial integration.
As an example, several equity groups are creating their own metrics
to help communities evaluate whether the implementation of stimulus
programs furthers racial and ethnic equity. One mechanism for doing so
is through the creation of "opportunity impact statements" intended to
measure the extent to which federal stimulus programs, and other fed228
eral programs, further opportunity for racial and ethnic minorities.
224. See generally John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics,
Culture, and Justice in America 19-35 (1996) (cataloguing conventional arguments
against affirmative action).
225. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting failure of some states to meet
minority hiring goals set in conjunction with stimulus funding).
226. E.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am., San Diego Chapter v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., No. 2:09-CV-01622-JAMGGH (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2009).
227. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting disagreements among courts
regarding extent to which FHA requires grantees to further integrate housing programs).
228. See, e.g., Opportunity Agenda, The Opportunity Impact Statement: Expanding
the American Dream 2-5 [hereinafter Opportunity Agenda, Impact Statement], at http://
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Such statements might be formal mechanisms used by federal and state
agencies to measure the impacts of federal spending programs 229 as well
as tools used by advocacy groups and citizens. 230 Opportunity impact
statements would include familiar civil rights equity goals such as ensuring that government aid reaches low-income and minority communities,
providing contracting opportunities for minority- and women-owned
2 31
businesses, and collecting employment data by race and ethnicity.
However, this approach also considers whether stimulus funds sustain infrastructure in cities (which are often predominantly minority), invest in
public transportation, connect low-income, low-skilled workers to job
training and career pathways, and create low-income housing in racially
23 2
integrated, low-poverty neighborhoods.
None of this is to suggest that governments or nongovernmental organizations will always agree on the relevant equity metric. Stakeholders
may disagree over racial equity goals and whether particular outlays of
stimulus funds are furthering that goal. Attempts to judicially and administratively enforce Title VI and Title VIII constraints on federal spending
led to similar disputes-with stakeholders disagreeing over the federal
role in promoting integration. 23 3 These new equity metrics are not immune from such contestations, but this new approach permits groups to
organize around more expansive conceptions of equity than are often
permissible under existing civil rights laws.
b. Structuring Citizenship. - Particular substantive equity goals and
the process of making equity and fairness claims of federal spending can
serve to structure citizenship. The ultimate goal is to promote inclusion
in the benefits of recovery, but also the broader idea that inattention to
race in federal spending can serve to cement or exacerbate inequality.
opportunityagenda.org/files/field file/The%200pportunity%201mpact%20Statement.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (detailing
components of opportunity impact statement).
229. See id. at 8-11 (proposing process for agency incorporation of opportunity
impact assessments and statements).
230. See Opportunity Agenda, Ensuring Equal Opportunity in Our Nation's
Economic Recovery Efforts 3-5 (2009) [hereinafter Opportunity Agenda, Ensuring], at
http://opportuniyagenda.org/files/fieldfile/Fact%2Sheet%20-%20Ensuring%2Equal
%200pportunity%20in%200ur%20Nation's%20Economic%20Recovery%20Efforts.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing how advocates can monitor stimulus
effort).
231. See, e.g., Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race & Ethnicity at Ohio State Univ.,
Ten Recommendations,
at http://fairrecovery.org/docs/tenrecommendations.pdf
[hereinafter Kirwan Institute, Ten Recommendations] (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (outlining ten principles for "fair" recovery);
Opportunity Agenda, Impact Statement, supra note 228, at 11-12 (proposing assessment
of minority inclusion in contracting and employment opportunities).
232. See, e.g., Kirwan Institute, Ten Recommendations, supra note 231.
233. See supra notes 182-203 and accompanying text (describing enforcement
history of Title VI and Title VIII).
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The citizenship and inclusion norms already present in federal civil
rights laws provide a foundation for these claims. Stakeholders draw on
existing civil rights laws to further the broader principle that federal
spending fairly benefit all groups, and to help advance equity for historically disadvantaged groups. Indeed, civil rights and equity groups that
have begun to monitor the stimulus often explicitly ground their quest
for "fairness" in stimulus spending on the values embedded in civil rights
23 4
laws governing federal spending.
Certain difficulties no doubt attend efforts to make such claims. One
difficulty is that more powerful civil rights interests, such as minority and
women contractors, are likely to prevail in the political marketplace over
less powerful minority interests, such as women receiving welfare or unemployed construction workers. Already, minority contractors-historically among the most organized minority interest groups at the federal
and state levels-have been among the most prominent critics of the im235
plementation of the Recovery Act.
Another difficulty is that claims that appear as rights claims may
seem as subordinate to the broad goal of economic recovery andjob creation. Given the universalist aspirations of the stimulus effort, claims of
racial fairness may seem illegitimate. 23 6 In the context of a severe recession, too, these claims may appear luxurious. This parallels the problem
that the fledgling civil rights interest groups had in challenging what they
saw as insufficient attention to race in New Deal programs. 2 37 Yet, the
New Deal manifests the very lesson that equity advocates seek to make
plain in their responses to the current recovery effort-that substantive
inequality can result from inattention to racial consequences.
c. Increasing Visibility. - Finally, the promise of increased visibility
for federal spending questions may hold the most promise. The technological tools of transparency-the use of web technology and data mapping-allow visualization of the equity impacts of federal spending and
render visible what is otherwise invisible. As discussed in Part I, the effects of federal spending become hidden in subsidies and in state and
local government action, 2 38 and thus federal responsibility and the effect
of federally created structures might be difficult for the general public to
track and apprehend.
234. See, e.g., Opportunity Agenda, Ensuring, supra note 230, at 1 ("This fact
sheet . . . describes the ways in which existing laws require equal opportunity in jobs,
housing, health care, transportation, and other sectors, and offers specific ideas for
holding public and private officials accountable.").
235. See Glantz, supra note 157 ("Minority contractors say they're seeing only a small
fraction of the stimulus dollars.").
236. See Powell, supra note 137, at 798-800 ("Once a race-blind position is adopted,
it becomes difficult to justify race-sensitive or race-specific policies or laws ....
If race is
irrelevant, what is the justification legally or otherwise for using it?").
237. See Poole, supra note 57, at 97-139 (discussing challenges New Deal-era civil
rights groups faced in promoting equity during development of Social Security Act).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
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In addition, visualization and mapping also address another form of
invisibility: They translate technical information about budgets and
spending-previously understood by only a small set of experts-to a
broader group of potential stakeholders. The work of monitoring federal
spending programs has been limited to a few groups and lawyers in
Washington, D.C., who are familiar with federal budgets and programs,
monitoring contracting compliance, and administrative and legislative
advocacy. These new efforts potentially expand the range of groups involved, permit new connections between traditional Washington-based
interest groups and state and local organizations, and expand the forms
of advocacy. Thus, Washington-based interest groups are reaching out to
state and local women's groups, immigrants, and racial minority groups
to provide technical assistance on how these groups and their communi23 9
ties can benefit from stimulus funding as well as track impacts.

In short, while there are challenges to leveraging the transparency
and accountability frame, the approach holds promise. Given the lack of
robust rights-based constraints to federal spending, this new approach allows equity groups to move beyond conceptions of antidiscrimination
rights, and mobilize around more expansive notions of fairness, equity,
and inclusion. The principle that expenditures of federal money should
be fair and inclusive might not yet be fully realized-these principles are
contested and difficult to enforce administratively and judicially, or to
realize in the political sphere. Yet mobilization efforts to promote equity
in federal spending need not be limited by existing notions of fairness;
they can commence a process to elaborate and embed these norms in the
public sphere.
239. See, e.g., Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race & Ethnicity at Ohio State Univ.,
Beyond the Quick Fix: ARRA Contracting, Jobs, and Building a Fair Recovery for Florida
1, 24-25 (2010), available at http://fairrecovery.org/docs/beyondthequickfix.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (measuring impact of ARRA and recommending policy
changes in order to "maximiz[e] job creation from ARRA funding and help[ ] hard hit
communities of color to get their fair share ofjobs"); Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race &
Ethnicity at Ohio State Univ., How Fair Is Florida? Recession, Recovery, Equity and
Opportunity in Florida 3-4, 16-22 (2009), available at http://fairrecovery.org/docs/
fl2.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (analyzing data on ARRA contracts and
proposed projects, finding ARRA's resource allocation follows current race and gender
opportunity disparity, and arguing for holistic plan for "ensur[ing] that [ARRA] funds are
disbursed in a fair and equitable manner"); Office of Research, Advocacy, and Legislation,
Nat'l Council of La Raza, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: Key
Components of Interest to Latino Communities 3-6 (2009), available at http://www.
nclr.org/index.php/publications/memo-to-nclr-affiliatestheamericanrecovery-andreinvestment act of_2009_key_componentsof interesttoilatino-communities/ (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (oudining key ARRA program investments of interest to
Latino community and requesting information regarding secured ARRA funding for
tracking purposes).
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CONCLUSION

In the 1930s, nascent civil rights groups began to sound the alarm
about the adverse racial impacts of New Deal programs. Their advocacy
efforts were spotty, overshadowed by the imperative of battling the patent
horrors of lynching and Jim Crow, and thus failed to prompt broader
240
forms of mobilization.
This time could be different. Antidiscrimination laws provide avenues for promoting affirmative and racially inclusive uses of federal
money that were unavailable to prior generations. The limited equity
metrics embodied in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the challenges of enforcing the relevant provisions of the Fair Housing Act, require that equity advocates harness these laws in novel ways to interrupt the multifarious mechanisms through which federal spending reproduces inequality.
This Essay shows that promise lies in employing new forms of data, transparency, and technology to press for racial equity and inclusion through
federal spending. The hope is that the civil rights infrastructure that is
emerging to evaluate, monitor, and respond to the current stimulus will
endure, and that the equity impacts of federal spending become a core
focus of civil rights advocacy and commentary. Ultimately, the success of
any of these efforts will depend on working at many levels-in courts,
agencies, and the public sphere-to persuade relevant decisionmakers
that federal spending matters for substantive racial equality. By directing
attention to the equity effects of federal spending, this Essay aims to inspire fresh thinking on additional mechanisms for leveraging federal
spending to promote racial and other forms of inclusion.

240. See Poole, supra note 57, at 97-139 (discussing work of civil rights groups who
sought to challenge New Deal exclusions).
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